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1. Introduction
“Argentina’s central bank governor Juan Carlos Fabrega has resigned after less
than a year in office. He will be replaced by Alejandro Vanoli, who analysts say
is more in tune with the economic policies of President Cristina Fernandez.”
(BBC, 02 October, 2014)
“President Trump must soon decide whether to renominate Ms. Yellen or pick
someone similarly inclined to emphasize economic growth. Or, instead, he could
accede to the wishes of many conservatives for a Fed chairman more worried
about inflation.” (NYT, 24 August, 2017)
The need to delegate monetary policy to a central bank that is both independent and
held accountable for price stability was first argued by Rogoff (1985), based on the dynamic
inconsistency theory of inflation introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and further
elaborated in Barro and Gordon (1983). While several studies have documented a negative
relationship between central bank independence (henceforth CBI) and inflation (Cukierman
(1992), Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992)), these findings have been challenged
on several grounds. It has been observed that the reduced form specification may omit
important variables, such as society’s aversion to inflation (Posen (1995a)), preference for
delegation (Crowe (2008)), raising reverse causality concerns (Dreher et al. (2008)). These
limitations motivate the need for a formal causal mechanism to justify the empirical litera-
ture, and separate CBI’s role from other channels that generate macroeconomic stability.
I establish this mechanism in two steps. To connect with the empirical literature, I first
document the relationship between CBI and macroeconomic stability. I focus on the de
facto measure of CBI, which is proxied by the chairman1 turn over rate (henceforth TOR),2
and macroeconomic instability. While several reasons may be attributed to chairman TOR,
it can be argued that frequent replacement of the central bank chairman may reflect the
removal of those who ‘challenge’ the government, as highlighted in the case of Argentina, or,
1Throughout the paper I use the terms “governor” and “chairman” interchangeably to identify the head
of central banking systems, for which titles in different countries vary.
2The most widely employed legal indicators of central bank independence are (updates of) the indexes of
Cukierman et al. (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991). Legal measures of CBI suffer from many issues (Eijffinger et
al. (1996), Cukierman (1992) and Vuletin and Zhu (2011)). For example, de jure institutional rules and laws
may not reflect the actual degree of independence in many countries, especially in developing ones. Instead,
“de facto” measures of independence, such as the frequency of changes in central bank governors suggest
that, at least above some threshold, a more rapid turnover of central bank governors indicates less CBI.
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given the recent Trump-Yellen dynamic, maybe even in the United States.3 A government
may frequently fire or pressure the highest monetary authority to quit when he/she does
not pursue expansionary monetary policy to exploit the short-run trade-off between output
and inflation, which may be achieved through a readjustment in the policy objectives.4 I
model these shifts using time-varying policy parameters in a New Keynesian framework.
By introducing a “chairman dummy” in the estimation process, I present a novel technique
to quantify what I term the “chairman effect”, which connects the frequency of changes in
the policy preferences with the TOR of central bank chairman. Using quarterly data on 42
advanced and developing economies, I find this channel to be a source of significant macroe-
conomic volatility. “Executive capture” of the central bank is identified by disaggregating
chairman turnover into (i) premature exits and (ii) whether the replacement was an ally of
the government. The results show that executive capture explains approximately 25 per-
cent of the volatility in inflation in developing economies, and 15 percent of the volatility in
inflation in advanced economies.
The use of the new panel data set developed by Vuletin and Zhu (2011) confirms the
positive and significant relationship between TOR and inflation volatility. The additional
controls are robust to a variety of channels that effect this relationship: the inclusion of coun-
try fixed effects, degree of trade openness, alternative exchange and monetary agreements,
such as fixed exchange rate and inflation targeting regimes, and output volatility. Notable
contributions include robustness for the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Laurens
(2005), Mishra et al. (2012) and Mishra and Montiel (2013)), and to the type of government
regimes (Aisen and Veiga (2006), Aisen and Veiga (2008)).
In the second half of the paper, I introduce time-varying monetary policy parameters to
capture shifts in policy preferences using a New Keynesian model. As Clarida et al. (1998a)
note, this specification for the policy rule implies that the policy reaction function is stable
during the tenure of the chairmen in charge at the time, but may vary across Chairmen.5
The model is generalized to include positive trend inflation along the lines of Ascari and
Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014). I use Bayesian estimation techniques to
quantify the contribution of the policy shock (the shock to the Taylor parameter) to the
3Cukierman et al. (1992) conjecture that the frequent changes of the central bank governor give political
authorities the "opportunity to pick those who will do their will.
4The theoretical motivation for modeling the chairman effect using a time-varying parameter approach is
based on the analysis offered by Cukierman (1992), who uses a simple central bank loss function to capture
shifts in the relative emphasis on employment and price stability, and where the stochastic policy variable
follows an AR(1) process. These shocks may represent readjustments in policy objectives and characterize
policymakers who place different relative weights on given policy objectives as being of different “types”.
5The premise that the emphasis of policy on alternative objectives is time invariant does not seem very
realistic in any case (see Lakdawala (2016) for a recent discussion).
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historical macroeconomic volatility in the United States.6 This shock is estimated to be
highly persistent and volatile, explaining a large proportion of volatility in inflation and
interest rates. Since the change in policy is implemented gradually, giving expectations time
to adjust, the output effects are much smaller.
Two exercises connect the independence mechanism to the theoretical model. As a bench-
mark, I first introduce a “chairman dummy” in the model. The dummy is identified using an
additional data series in the model’s estimation procedure that includes appointment dates
of Federal Reserve chairmen. This enables me to identify the “chairman effect” and separate
the variability in policy attributed to changes in the chairman from the aggregate volatility
in policy. The “chairman effect” amounts to approximately 18 percent of the variability in in-
flation and to 32 percent of the variability in the interest rates. Counterfactual analysis finds
a positive relationship between chairman TOR and inflation volatility via the time-varying
parameter mechanism. I apply this empirical strategy to extract the “chairman effect” for
all countries considered in my panel specification.
To identify the type of governors from the aggregate series, I distinguish between changes
that were premature, and whether the incoming chairman was an ally of the government.
Classifying chairmen in this manner purges regular changes from those that may point to
an executive capture of the central bank. Estimating the model with the “independence
effect” identifies those shifts in the policy parameter that occurred specifically due to a gov-
ernment seeking to exploit the inflation-output trade-off. The independence effect is found
to be quantitatively important: approximately 60 percent (25 percent) of total chairman
changes result in a parameter shift in the policy rule, explaining on average 25 percent (15
percent) of inflation volatility in developing (advanced) economies. Across countries there
exist significant heterogeneity. As expected, in certain advanced economies, such as in the
United Kingdom, the United States, Austria and the Netherlands, there is no evidence of
the independence effect even though policy varies across chairmen. This mechanism is more
prevalent in Argentina, as compared to Bulgaria or Malaysia, where a one-to-one relation-
ship emerges between changes in leadership and policy parameters, generating additional
inflation volatility. Therefore, executive capture of the central bank via the appointment of
a subservient chairman is found to generate significant macroeconomic volatility.
In the final part of the paper, I examine the theoretical implications of the policy shock.
Several interesting results are worth highlighting. First, the shock to policy propagates
at higher trend inflation, and when the mean weight on the response to inflation is large.
6I focus only on the weight attached to inflation in the policy rule. In an earlier version of the paper,
all policy coefficients including the coefficient on interest smoothing were allowed to vary. These were
subsequently excluded since they did not contribute to the macroeconomic dynamics.
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Conversely, the effect of this shock disappears at zero trend inflation, suggesting that positive
trend inflation serves as a crucial propagation mechanism in the model. This may imply
that the policy shock may be destabilizing at higher levels of trend inflation and when
the monetary authority is highly inflation averse. Second, the degree of persistence of the
policy shock determines the direction of the movement in interest rates; at larger degrees of
persistence, this shock leads to a rise in inflation despite a fall in interest rates. Despite the
lower nominal rate, the change in parameter has a contractionary effect (see, for example,
Galí (2009)). Finally, the effect of a shock to this parameter is observationally equivalent to
a shock to the inflation target, generating significant welfare effects.
This paper presents a number of important contributions. The primary contribution of
this paper is in highlighting and presenting a causal framework that justifies the relationship
between CBI and macroeconomic stability observed in the panel data.
The mechanism connecting CBI and policy shifts is based on a New-Keynesian frame-
work model with time varying monetary policy parameters. The use of a novel technique to
extract the “chairman effect” and the “independence effect” successfully addresses the issue
of causality – executive capture of the central bank via the appointment of a subservient
chairman is found to generate significant macroeconomic volatility. This result contributes
to a broad literature: the classic relationship between CBI and macroeconomic volatility
(Cukierman (1992), Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992)), reasons for governor dis-
missal (Dreher et al. (2008), Dreher et al. (2010), Klomp and de Haan (2010)), political
milieu and central bank TOR (Keefer and Stasavage (2003), Alesina and Stella (2010),
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011), Masciandaro (2014), Ennser-Jedenastik (2014), Artha and
Haan (2015)), and on governor type (Moser-Boehm (2006), Vuletin and Zhu (2011), Adolph
(2013), Fernández-Albertos (2015)). The current paper extends the policy literature (Eijffin-
ger and Hoeberichts (2008), Bernanke (2010), Adolph (2013), Taylor (2013), Levieuge and
Lucotte (2014)) by suggesting that the nature of appointment of central bank chairmen may
need to be further investigated. Klomp and de Haan (2010) reach similar conclusions.
The modeling exercise in itself extends the literature on two fronts. First, it contributes
to the literature that has thus far focused solely on the effect of changes in these parameters
on determinacy and on policy activeness (Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. (1998a), Orphanides
(2002), Boivin (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004a), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
and Foerster (2016)), and has yet to connect shocks to the policy parameter and macroe-
conomic volatility along the lines of Roberts (2006), and Canova et al. (2010). Second, the
analytical results, such as the crucial role of positive trend inflation and the average weight
on the policy parameter as propagation mechanisms to the policy shock present several in-
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teresting insights and areas for future work. For example, combining these theoretical results
with the historical evolution of the policy shock may contribute to the extensive research
on the changes in the conduct of monetary policy, the transmission mechanism, and the
structural and policy shocks in the U.S. (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Clarida et al.
(1998a), Stock and Watson (2002), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Primiceri (2005b), Cogley
and Sargent (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano and Prim-
iceri (2008), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), Bhattarai et al. (2016)). The quantitative
similarities between shifts in policy parameters and exogenous shocks to interest rates con-
nect with the findings of Lakdawala (2016), offering an alternative perspective on explaining
the source of monetary policy shocks.
Estimating the model using Bayesian techniques for the large number of countries con-
tributes to country-specific research work on the subject; for many countries, the present
study is a pioneering effort to estimate this model, serving as a benchmark for future work
in this area. Devoting more effort to explaining the role of time-varying parameters in
medium-to-large scale DSGE models along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007) with a
fiscal aspect (Sargent and Wallace (1984), Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), De Resende (2007),
Kumhof et al. (2010), Davig and Leeper (2011), Leeper (1991), Leeper and Walker (2012))
may be of interest to future researchers.
The paper is ordered as follows: I present cross-country evidence on the relationship
between chairman turnover and inflation volatility in the next section. Section 3 outlines
the structural mechanism, focusing on the estimation procedure, and simulation. Section
4 uses numerical analysis to identify the chairman effect from the data. Section 5 extracts
the effect of different types of chairman changes. Section 6 analyzes the shock to the policy
parameter. Section 7 concludes.
2. Central Bank Independence and Macroeco-
nomic Stability: Cross-Country Evidence
To connect with the empirical literature, I first document evidence between the turnover rate
(TOR) of central bank governors,7 which serves as a proxy for central bank independence,
7Similar to Klomp and de Haan (2010), I calculate the turnover rate (TOR) using a rolling average
over four years preceding a central bank governor change. According to Vuletin and Zhu (2011) using
rolling windows to calculate average turnover rate of central bank governors allows for a more gradual and
continuous institutional change. It is important to remark that because they calculate the rolling average
over four years preceding a central bank governor change, they do not include current or future changes of
central bank governor in the calculation of TOR. This strategy somewhat purges reverse causality concerns;
6
and macroeconomic instability, focusing on variability in inflation across countries.8 To test
the relationship between TOR and inflation volatility in a pooled (averaged) data setting,
I present a basic analysis of this relationship in section 2.1. In section 2.2, I examine the
robustness of this relationship against various control variables.9 The results presented in
this section highlight a positive and significant relationship between chairman turnover and
inflation variability. Even though the use of this technique and an increase in the number
of controls improve predictability, the limitations, such as those related to the omission
of other potentially important controls remain a challenge (Posen (1995a)). While these
results highlight an interesting empirical observation, the latter part of the paper focuses on
establishing a causal relationship to explain these stylized facts.
2.1. Benchmark Results
I test whether a higher rate of turnover in the governors of a central bank is correlated with
greater variability in inflation. I calculate rolling window of four years to calculate standard
deviation of inflation (Bowdler and Malik (2005)) to obtain a measure of inflation variability.
The results of this section are robust for window length of three and five years. Figure 1
plots the simple correlation between average inflation volatility and average central bank
governor turnover rate for each country over the entire sample, and further splitting this
relationship into advanced and developing country classifications. In appendix A.3, I list the
overall period average turnover ratio and frequency of change in central bank governor.
The three panels in figure 1 capture a positive relationship between the TOR and the
variability in inflation. The first panel plots the relationship for all countries with the
second and third panels representing this relationship for advanced and developing countries,
respectively. Developed countries are characterized both by lower average volatility, and
lower TOR, which is bounded from above by 0.30, suggesting a replacement time of three
this is a crucial improvement as the existing literature, such as Dreher et al. (2008), has found past inflation
to increase the likelihood that a central banker is replaced. Overall, my results are robust when calculating
TOR over two, three and five years.
8Whereas both the level and the variability of inflation matter from a welfare perspective, I restrict my
attention to studying inflation variability. First, under nominal contracts, uncertainty about future prices
is likely to entail higher risk premia and unanticipated changes in the distribution of wealth. These costs
mean that for a given average inflation rate, higher inflation volatility can depress economic growth (Elder
(2004), Fatás and Mihov (2005), Grier and Grier (2006)). I calculate rolling window of four years to calculate
standard deviation of inflation (Bowdler and Malik (2005)) to obtain a measure of inflation variability. The
results of this section are robust for window length of three and five years.
9The baseline data on governor dismissal are compiled by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), and consist of 42
countries (of which 21 are advanced economies and 21 are developing countries) for the period 1972 through
to 2006. Detail on the data used in this estimation is available in the appendix.
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years. This is in sharp contrast to the developing-country context, which is characterized
by both greater TOR and higher average volatility. Chile, for example, has a TOR of
approximately 1.5 years, and inflation volatility in excess of 4.0, which is approximately
twice the volatility of the upper bound for the developed countries.
Figure 1: Turnover Rate and Inflation Volatility
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Note: This figure presents the relationships between the TOR (x-axis) and the variability in inflation (y-
axis). The top panel plots the relationship for all countries with the second and third panels representing
this relationship in advanced and developing countries, respectively.
To be more precise, I consider the following specification:
σpii,t = α1 + β1TORi,t +
H∑
h=1
Ξhx
k
i,t + i + ηi,t (1)
Here σpii is inflation volatility, TORi,t is the central bank governor turnover rate, xki,t are
k control variables and i represent country fixed effects. The results of the baseline case
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with no controls are presented in table 1. Columns 1 - 3 in table 1 report the baseline
OLS regressions for all, advanced and developing countries. In this regression, I exclude
control variables or fixed effects, and the residuals ηi,t are set to be homoscedastic and are
not autocorrelated. Moreover, outliers due to high inflation observations are included in this
regression. These regressions formalize the relationship plotted in figure 1, and suggest that
higher rates of changes governors are correlated with greater variability in inflation for each
type of country. Quantitatively speaking, the results are significantly large, especially for
developing countries, a finding that is consistent with the previous literature, and which may
be interpreted to imply that the TOR channel has a larger effect on developing countries.
The results reported in columns 4 - 6 allow for homoscedasticity by estimating robust
standard errors and error autocorrelation within countries. The statistical significance of
TOR falls for advanced economies but remains strong for developing countries. These find-
ings coincide with the existing literature (see, for example, Cukierman (1992), Cukierman
et al. (1992), De Haan and Siermann (1996) and Klomp and de Haan (2010)) and confirm
that TOR is highly correlated with macroeconomic stability in developing countries.
Next, I exclude the 10 percent of observations with the largest inflation variability and
highest levels of inflation. The turnover rate remains pertinent when all countries are pooled
(column 7), and when countries are separated in groups (columns 8 and 9). These results
differ from the findings of De Haan and Kooi (2000), Sturm and De Haan (2001), Dreher et
al. (2008) and Klomp and de Haan (2010), since this relationship is estimated to be quite
strong for developing countries. However, consistent with their findings, the relationship
between TOR and inflation volatility weakens for developed countries when high inflation
observations are excluded.
Last, in order to control for within-country variability as opposed to cross-country vari-
ability, I verify the robustness of my results by including a country fixed effect i. Examples
of within-country effects include a society’s preferences toward low inflation, fiscal conduct
and differences in historical experience with inflation, or time-varying institutional effects
such as law and order, corruption and bureaucratic quality. The statistical significance of
the effect of changes of governor fades for advanced economies but remains robust for de-
veloping countries. Overall, my baseline results support previous findings, and confirm that
the turnover rate of central bank governors produces more pronounced results in developing
countries than in advanced economies (see, for example, Vuletin and Zhu (2011)). By using
rolling window estimates of TOR, my results contribute to the literature by extending this
relationship to inflation variability as well.10
10Following Cukierman et al. (1992), I investigated the causality between inflation and the TOR by using a
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2.2. Including Controls
In table 2, I estimate panel fixed effect regressions via the same estimation techniques used for
estimates in columns 10 - 12 of the previous tables. Other than the rolling window estimate
of TOR, I build on the existing literature by including additional controls to ameliorate
the omitted variable bias. I find a statistically significant positive relationship between
the central bank chairman turnover rate and inflation volatility even when controlling for
the structure of the economy, alternative exchange and monetary agreements, and after
controlling for periods where the chairman might be replaced due to economic distress.
Columns 1 - 21 of table 2 study whether the results are robust to the structure of the
economy, and, especially, to the institutional autonomy of the central bank. Columns 22 -
27 look at the TOR under crisis times as discussed in Vuletin and Zhu (2011), and columns
28 - 30 are estimated using all controls.
Columns 1 - 3 include controls on the type of regime, indicating whether a government
is autocratic or democratic. The inclusion of the type of regime can control for the effect
of institutional stability on inflation variability (see, for example, Aisen and Veiga (2006),
Aisen and Veiga (2008)). The type of regime does not affect the strength of my benchmark
findings regarding the influence of TOR on inflation variability.
The conduct of monetary policy has been shown to depend crucially on the transmission
mechanism, and the ability of short-term interest rates to influence the real economy (see, for
example, George et al. (1999)). An important component of monetary policy transmission
is determined by financial development as discussed in Woodford (2012) and Smets et al.
(2013), Laurens (2005), Mishra et al. (2012) and Mishra and Montiel (2013). Columns 4 - 6
present the role of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by including one measure
of financial development: efficiency.11 This relationship is both negative and significant for
developed countries only - suggesting that institutional changes such as de jure independence
of the monetary authority may be less important for taming inflation variability in these
countries.
Furthermore, Svensson (1997), Ball and Sheridan (2004), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
simple Granger causality test. This allowed me to estimate the bivariate autoregressive processes for inflation
and turnover rate. The coefficient of lagged turnover in the inflation equation is highly significant, as is the
coefficient of lagged inflation in the turnover equation.
11This indicator represents the efficiency of financial agents and markets in intermediating resources and
facilitating financial transactions. Since a number of variables can further be categorized under efficiency, I
take the mean of variety of indicators related to efficiency. My results remain robust to a variety of other
indicators representing financial development, such as depth (size of financial institutions and markets),
stability (stability of financial institutions and markets), access (degree to which individuals can and do use
financial services), and other factors that influence financial development.
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and Alpanda and Honig (2014) have argued in favor of the benefits of adopting a fixed ex-
change rate regime or an explicit inflation target to achieve price stability beyond delegating
monetary authority to an independent and credible central banker. In Columns 7 - 9, I
include a dummy variable to capture variations in inflation-targeting countries. Specifically
this dummy is set to one if the country has an explicit inflation target policy, and set to zero
otherwise. Columns 10 - 12 include a fixed exchange rate regime (Fixed ERR), a dummy
variable equal to one if I use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) de facto exchange-rate-regime
coarse classification. My findings support existing empirical evidence by suggesting that
inflation-targeting policies are associated with lower variability in inflation; fixed exchange-
rate regimes do not seem to influence this relationship.
The existing literature, including work by Katsimbris (1985), Judson and Orphanides
(1999) and Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), has pointed to a positive relationship between
the level the and variability in inflation, as well as between output variability and inflation
variability. Columns 13 - 15, which include the level of inflation of the country, suggest
that inflation variability is positively related to inflation, but output volatility (as shown in
columns 16 to 18) does not influence variability in inflation. However, my results show that
these relationships hold only for developed economies thus validating the results found in
Blanchard and Simon (2001). Trend inflation is also found to be critical in explaining the
variability in inflation.
Romer et al. (1993) has argued that central banks in countries that are more open to
trade exercise more restraint than their closed-economy counterparts because deviating from
their long-run fundamentals can prove costly. Columns 19 to 21 include trade openness
(‘Openness’), defined as the percentage ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. My findings
support the findings favored by this strand of literature, and indicate that inflation variability
indeed decreases with trade openness.
I include the effect of bank crises (columns 22 - 24) and the effect of default episodes
(columns 25 - 27) on inflation variability. I find that banking crises as well as default episodes
increase inflation volatility in developing countries.12 Banking crises are not associated with
higher inflation variability even at the 10 percent significance level. This suggests that
the independence of the monetary authority should not be compromised during periods of
economic distress.
Once I include all of these controls simultaneously, the relationship between TOR and
inflation holds (columns 28 - 30 in table 2) and which remains significant at the 5 percent
level. It is important to note that whether the controls are introduced one at a time or all
12In the data, there are no episodes of default in advanced countries for the period analyzed.
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together, they do not affect the strength of the benchmark findings regarding the influence
of TOR on inflation. Overall, the R-squared of the regression in columns 28 - 30 is close to
the benchmark R-squared found in Vuletin and Zhu (2011), and higher than that found in
Cukierman et al. (1992).
I also split these controls into “stressful” times and “tranquil” times, designations that are
similar to those considered in Vuletin and Zhu (2011). The additional controls capturing the
structural mechanism are removed. My results remain robust to their specification as well.13
Table 3 presents these results.
Table 3: TOR Regressions: ‘Stressful’ and ‘Tranquil’ Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σpii,t All Advanced Developing All Advanced Developing
countries countries countries countries countries countries
TOR 2.381** 0.389 4.180** 3.093*** 0.765 5.125***
[0.885] [0.545] [1.531] [0.954] [0.856] [1.445]
Openess -2.556*** -2.306** -2.691**
[0.801] [0.922] [1.066]
Infl. target -0.396 -0.204 -0.660
[0.389] [0.461] [0.760]
Fixed ERR -0.821** -0.311 -1.119**
[0.309] [0.475] [0.424]
Trend Inflation 0.169*** 0.160*** 0.158***
[0.019] [0.024] [0.027]
Bank crisis 0.473 0.192 0.779
[0.443] [0.338] [0.774]
Default 1.927** 1.596**
[0.716] [0.672]
Standard errors Robust & Robust & Robust & Robust & Robust & Robust &
cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
High-inflation obs. No No No No No No
Obs. 643 384 259 929 524 405
R-squared 0.223 0.179 0.281 0.085 0.008 0.131
Number of countries 40 21 19 42 21 21
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Dependent variable is inflation volatility. Constant coefficients are not reported.
The results presented in this section highlight a positive and significant relationship be-
tween chairman turnover and inflation variability. In particular, these results remain robust
when controlling for variables to measure the structure of the economy (e.g., the transmis-
13These results are also robust to including the structural controls in this specification.
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sion mechanism), the type of regime in place to measure the institutional structure, and
“tranquil” and “stressful” time variables that drive the variability in inflation. Interestingly,
positive trend inflation plays a significant role in generating additional variability in infla-
tion, a finding that supports the unique theoretical relationship between policy parameters,
trend inflation and rational expectation determinacy results in Ascari (2004) and Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011).
While the use of rolling window estimates of turnover rates, and an increase in the number
of controls improves predictability in inflation volatility, the limitations, such as those related
to the omission of other potentially important controls remains a challenge. For example,
the reduced form regression may omit important variables, such as society’s aversion to
inflation (Posen (1995a) and Posen (1995b)) or a preference for delegation (Crowe (2008)).
This relationship may also suffer from a reverse causality problem (Dreher et al. (2008)).
Despite providing important stylized conclusions, the limitations motivate the need for a
formal structural mechanism to establish the causal relationship between the macroeconomic
stability and CBI.
3. Model and Identification
I employ a New Keynesian DSGE framework to model the impact of time-varying monetary
policy parameters on inflation volatility. The particular model considered in this paper is
generalized to include positive steady state inflation, which has been empirically shown to be
an important determinant of inflation variability and persistence (Benati (2008)). Section 3.1
and 3.2 present the baseline structure of this model. Section 3.3 outlines the modification in
the policy rule that allows me to identify the variability in the policy parameters attributed
to changes in the chairman, and the procedure to extract this information from the data.
3.1. The Log-Linearized Model
The model consists of the following equations that are micro-founded from the optimality
conditions of households and firms. A monetary authority responsible for setting nominal
interest rates is introduced later. For a detailed exposition of the positive trend inflation
New Keynesian model, the reader is referred to the detailed appendix in Ascari and Sbordone
(2014). The key equations of the model can be summarized by the following equations:
pit = [βp¯i
1−χ + η(− 1)]Etpit+1 + κyt + λϕat − λϕst + ηEtφt+1 (2)
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φt = (1− σ)(1− θβp¯i(1−χ)(−1))yt + θβp¯i(1−χ)(−1)[(− 1)Etpit+1 + Etφt+1] (3)
st = ξpit + θp¯i
(1−χ)()st−1 (4)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + gt (5)
Here pit stands for the inflation rate, yt for de-trended output, at is the technology shock, gt
is the demand shock, st is price dispersion, φt is an auxiliary process that participates in the
determination of inflation, and it is the nominal interest rate.
Equation (5) is the log-linearized Euler condition, which captures the negative relation-
ship between output and the real interest rate. This is determined by the difference in the
nominal interest rate, it, and expected inflation, pit+1. Due to the inter-temporal substitution
effect, higher real returns induce greater savings, depressing aggregate demand. Expecta-
tions of positive output expand current output, as economic agents prefer to smooth their
consumption. Since the underlying model has no investment, output is proportional to con-
sumption in equilibrium. Aggregate output is subject to a shock gt that can be interpreted
as a shock to government spending, or to the households’ preferences.
As suggested by Ascari (2004), Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari et al. (2011), a pos-
itive steady state inflation rate, p¯i effects all coefficients in the Generalized New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve (GNKPC), described in equation (2) and (3). It is also influenced by st, the
process for price dispersion, equation (4). The forward-looking auxiliary process φt also par-
ticipates in the determinants of inflation. Since trend inflation leads to a smaller coefficient
on current output and a larger coefficient on future expected inflation, the NKPC under
positive trend inflation becomes more “forward-looking.” The contemporaneous relationship
between inflation and output progressively weakens, and the inflation rate becomes less sen-
sitive to variations in output and more forward looking. Price indexation counterbalances
some of the effects of trend inflation. The GNKPC under trend inflation nests the text-book
version of the NKPC, which can be derived by setting p¯i = 1 or under full price indexation.
The parameters β is the discount factor from the consumer’s utility problem, ϕ is the
labor elasticity, σ is the relative risk-aversion parameter,  is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity
of substitution among goods, θ is the Calvo (1983) parameter, χ is the degree of price
indexation, and p¯i is the steady state inflation. Finally, λ, η, κ and ξ are all convolutions of
16
the structural parameters and take on the following form:
λ =
(1− θp¯i(−1)(1−χ))(1− θp¯i(1−χ))
θp¯i(−1)(1−χ)
η = β(p¯i(1−χ) − 1)(1− θp¯i(−1)(1−χ))
κ = λp¯i,(σ + ϕ)− ηp¯i,(1− σ) ξ = θp¯i
(−1)(1−χ)(p¯i1−χ − 1)
1− θp¯i(−1)(1−χ)
3.2. The Monetary Authority
The model is closed by introducing a monetary authority that sets the interest rates. Similar
to Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), I allow the policy coefficient on infla-
tion to vary over time. Both the variables and the corresponding policy parameters in the
following specification of the policy rule are expressed in gross terms:
It = Vt(It−1)Φi [Π
Φpi,t
t Y
Φy
t ]
1−Φi (6)
In an earlier version of the paper, all policy coefficients including the coefficient on inter-
est smoothing were allowed to vary. These were subsequently excluded since they did not
contribute to the macroeconomic dynamics.14 The equation can be log-linearized to obtain
the time-varying rule in the following form:15
it = Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)[Φpi(p¯issφpi,t + pit) + Φyyt] + vt (7)
Since equation (6) expresses the variables and the parameters in the policy rule in gross terms,
log-linearization returns a time-varying rule where the natural logarithm of the gross steady
state price level (p¯i) and rescales the time-varying parameter. vr,t captures the exogenous
component in the nominal interest rate. The policy parameter is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process: φpi,t = ρpφpi,t−1 + t where the error term t is assumed to be iid with zero mean and
variance σ2p. Notice that setting either p¯iss or φpi,t to zero in equation (7) returns a standard,
Taylor-type monetary policy rule considered in the literature.
This set-up allows me to distinguish between short-run changes in the policy parameters
from those that occur in the long run. The monetary authority systematically responds
to contemporaneous long run changes in inflation and output captured by the parameters,
Φpi and Φy.16 Short-run changes in policy, φpi,t, may represent departures from the stan-
14The model was also estimated using various levels of trend inflation, but that did not change the under-
lying quantitative results. Similarly, the results remain unchanged when the model is adjusted to allow for
cross-country differences in trend inflation, as shown in section 4.3.
15Derivation of the log-linearization is available in the appendix A.2.
16Moreover, as long as Φi > 0, the monetary policy rule accounts for some degree of interest rate smoothing,
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dard policy rule. Therefore, the policy framework may be interpreted as follows: central
banks follow policy that is consistent with the central bank’s specific framework (such as
an inflation-targeting central bank), which is represented by the long run parameters, while
deviations in policy are captured using the short run variable φpi,t.17 Clarida et al. (1998a)
present one reason why this may be so; the time-varying specification in the policy rule may
imply that the policy reaction function is stable during the tenure of the chairman in charge
at the time, but may vary across chairmen.
How do shifts in the inflation coefficient represent a reasonable mapping of the chairman
effect? The current framework suggests that shifts in policy may represent readjustments in
objectives, characterizing policymakers who place different relative weights on given policy
objectives as being of different “types”. Shifts in the policy parameters enter as an additional
shock in the monetary policy rule, leading to a shift in the nominal interest rates and affecting
inflation and output through the transmission mechanism comprising equations (2) – (5).
The theoretical motivation for modeling the chairman effect using a time-varying param-
eter approach is based on the analysis offered by Cukierman (1992), chapter 9, who uses
a simple central bank loss function to capture shifts in the relative emphasis on employ-
ment and price stability, and where the stochastic policy variable follows an AR(1) process.
Furthermore, Adolph (2013) shows that left- and right-wing governments tend to appoint
central bankers with different monetary preferences. Fernández-Albertos (2015) surveying
24 central banks find that even the most independent central bank does not operate in a
political vacuum. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) uses data on the partisan back-ground of
195 central bank governors in 30 European countries between 1945 and 2012 to test whether
partisan congruence between governors and the executive (the government or the president)
is associated with a higher probability of governor turnover. The author finds that partisan
ties to the government strongly increase a governor’s odds of survival vis-à-vis nonpartisan
and opposition-affiliated individuals.
Finally, in the complete model comprising equations (2) – (5) and (7), the structural
shocks, at, and gt and the exogenous policy shock vt are all assumed to follow a mean
zero AR(1) process, and are serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero,
persistence ρ, and standard deviation σ.
as observed from central banks’ tendency to smooth interest rate adjustments.
17For example an inflation-targeting central bank may have a consistent long-run aversion to inflation and
which will be captured as a high long-run value of Φpi.
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3.3. Identification of Chairman and Independence Effect
In this framework time-varying policy parameters capture shifts in central bank preferences
due to changes in the chairman. However, since changes in the policy parameters may occur
due to reasons beyond those limited to changes in the chairmanship, estimates of the variance
of this shock as captured by the policy rule (7) may be contaminated.18 Furthermore, not
all changes in chairmanship represent executive capture of the central bank.
To resolve this issue, I proceed in two steps. Including a “chairman dummy” in the
estimation procedure allows me separate the variability in the policy parameters attributed
specifically to the appointment of the chairman from changes in policy due to institutional
or welfare related reasons.19 In the second step, I differentiate voluntary exits that are part
of the naturally occurring process of the labor supply/attachment decisions of central bank
governors from the involuntary departures associated with central bank governors who are
perceived as challengers by the government, and I identify whether the incoming central
bank governor replacements have strong ties with the government. The first step identifies
the “chairman effect”, while the second step isolates the “independence effect” from the total
chairman effect.
Estimating the complete model using the three observables (inflation, output and interest
rates) allows me to capture the persistence and standard deviation, φpi,t = ρpφpi,t−1 + t. To
capture the “chairman effect” from this equation, I introduce a “chairman dummy” in the
estimation process. I introduce data consisting of values zero and one, with one specified
against the quarters corresponding to changes in the chairman of the central bank. For
example, in the U.S. version of the model, the data series contains five changes in the
chairman; therefore the dummy series has five observations equal to one at 1970:I (Martin –
Burns), 1978:I (Burns – Miller), 1979:III (Miller – Volcker), 1987:III (Volcker – Greenspan)
and 2006:I (Greenspan – Bernanke). Observations at other points in this series are set to zero.
The dummy enters in the variance component of the AR(1) process for policy. Therefore, the
estimated model returns ρp and σtp, where σtp captures the aggregate standard deviation of
changes in policy. Then σdp , which captures the “chairman effect” is extracted by taking the
difference between the total shift in policy parameters and the without dummy estimation,
18These factors may include pressure from the Treasury (Cukierman (1992)), the chairman’s own prefer-
ences regarding inflation levels (Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999)), the policymakers’ learning about the right
mechanism of the economy (Primiceri (2005a)), or the aim of achieving greater welfare (Taylor (1993)).
19In the model, U.S. data are treated as the benchmark to connect with the existing literature that has
modeled time-invariant rules in this set-up, and connect with the vast literature available that describes
the suitability of this model for the underlying data. In section 4.2 this exercise is extended to the other
countries included in the panel specification.
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using σdp = σtp−σp.20 This specification connects with the work of Clarida et al. (1998a) and
Boivin (2005), who use dummy variables to estimate changes in policy parameters.21
In the second step, I extract the “independence effect” from the total “chairman effect.”
To identify the type of governor changes I distinguish between a change that was premature,
as defined by whether a central bank governor completed his/her tenure, and a change that
led to a successor chairman who was an ally of the government. Excluding these changes in
the chairman from the aggregate turnover represent executive branch capture of the central
bank. This idea builds on work by Vuletin and Zhu (2011) who argue that governments
may frequently fire or pressure the highest monetary authority to quit when he/she does not
pursue expansionary monetary policy to exploit the short-run trade-off between output and
inflation. Other literature has also distinguished between the types of governors (see, for
example, Fernández-Albertos (2015), Moser-Boehm (2006), Adolph (2013)).
Re-estimating the model with the series that contains these type of governors enables
me to track those shifts in the policy parameters that occur when the government appoints
a subservient central bank governor to exploit the inflation-output trade-off. The model
is then used to decompose the volatility that results due to explicit executive capture of
the central bank due to the appointment of a specific “type” of chairman. In this manner,
the theoretical mechanism allows me to explain the relationship between macroeconomic
stability and central bank independence, which can be applied to a broad set of countries.
4. Benchmark Results
In this section, I present estimates of the parameters that describe the structural model
(section 4.1), as well as investigate the contribution of changes in chairman of the central
bank on macroeconomic volatility (section 4.2). Using the results from the models estimation
procedure, I extract the chairman effect by simulating the model in section 4.3.
20One may argue that the appointment of a new chairman should be reflected more in expected inflation
than realized inflation in the policy rule. My results are robust to estimating the policy rule on expected
inflation instead of realized inflation.
21Notice that the exogenous timing of U.S. chairman’s appointment permits me to separately identify the
“chairman effect” from the data. However, even if the timing of appointment is exogenous, one may argue
that the “type” of chairman (e.g. one who is particularly aggressive on inflation) may not be exogenous.
Chairman Volcker, for example, has acquired a reputation for having been harsher on inflation than his
predecessors. This can be identified using the dummy approach by only allowing for the “Volcker dummy”
in the data series. Other factors, such as those related to the central banks’ learning mechanism are best
captured by gradual changes in policy, rather than by large shifts during the periods corresponding to changes
in the chairman. In this sense, welfare-based changes in the long run parameter would be better reflected
in the evolution of the composition and structure of the FOMC rather than by the appointment of a new
chairman (see, for example, Tootell (1999)).
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4.1. Bayesian Estimation
The linear model, comprising equations (2) – (5) and the policy rule in equation (7), is
first solved using standard Blanchard-Kahn techniques, and then estimated using Bayesian
estimation techniques, setting the U.S. economy as a benchmark.
I calibrate a subset of the model’s parameters, a standard methodology in the literature.
The discount factor β is set to 0.99, the elasticity of substitution among goods  is set equal
to six, and the inverse of the labor elasticity ϕ is calibrated to one. µ, which represents the
relative weight of indexation to past inflation versus trend inflation, is set to zero. Trend
inflation is kept fixed to the average of the sample for the benchmark case. Varying this
average does not change the main conclusions of the paper. Using the priors presented
in Ascari et al. (2011), the model is estimated over the full sample from 1966:I through to
2008:II.22 The end-of-the-sample dates are chosen to avoid dealing with the Federal Reserve’s
unconventional monetary policy that began in September 2008. The posterior distribution
of the parameters is characterized using the methods outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007)
and are described in the appendix.
I use three quarterly U.S. time series: log of quarterly gross rate of the GDP deflator,
the log deviation of real GDP with respect to its long run trend, and the federal funds
rate. A fourth series, which contains information pertaining to the chairman dummy is
added. Specifically, this series consists of values zero and one, with one specified against the
quarters corresponding to changes in the chairman. For the U.S., there are five changes in
the chairman therefore the dummy series has five observations equal to one at 1970:I (Martin
– Burns), 1978:I (Burns – Miller), 1979:III (Miller – Volcker), 1987:III (Volcker – Greenspan)
and 2006:I (Greenspan – Bernanke). Observations at other points in this series are set to
zero.
I estimate three versions of the model. First, I constrain the time-varying policy parameter
to zero. In this case, the model is similar to the one presented in Ascari et al. (2011),
but estimated over the entire data sample. Second, I estimate the mode, including the
time-varying monetary policy rule. Third, I include the policy rule including the chairman
dummy. Table 4 reports the prior and posterior densities for the estimated parameters, the
mean, and the 10th, and 90th percentiles of the posterior distributions for each version of
the model. Details on the priors are included in appendix A.5.
22The model is also estimated over the sample 1955:I - 1965:IV to establish the validity of their priors,
and establish priors for the time-varying policy parameters.
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Table 4: Full Sample Estimation Results
Baseline (I) Extended (II) Dummy (III)
Posterior Posterior Posterior
Parameter Description Mean Mean Mean
[10th; 90th] [10th; 90th] [10th; 90th]
χ Indexation 0.82 0.51 0.50
[0.66; 0.99] [0.11; 0.99] [0.11; 0.99]
θ Calvo 0.92 0.58 0.64
[0.91; 0.94] [0.47; 0.69] [0.52; 0.74]
σ Risk aversion 2.89 2.24 2.36
[2.51; 3.25] [1.86; 2.64] [1.94; 2.79]
Φpi T. rule inflation 1.34 3.41 3.36
[1.07; 1.60] [2.87; 3.92] [2.82; 3.88]
Φy T. rule output 0.43 0.08 0.08
[0.31; 0.55] [0.03; 0.13] [0.03; 0.13]
Φi T. rule smooth 0.78 0.52 0.63
[0.73; 0.83] [0.37; 0.66] [0.50; 0.75]
ρa Tech. pers. 0.89 0.98 0.98
[0.86; 0.93] [0.98; 0.99] [0.96; 0.99]
ρv Policy pers. 0.23 0.28 0.22
[0.10; 0.34] [0.16; 0.39] [0.11; 0.34]
ρg IS pers. 0.82 0.92 0.90
[0.78; 0.86] [0.88; 0.96] [0.85; 0.95]
ρp Policy (II) pers. − 0.96 0.99
− [0.93; 0.98] [0.98; 0.99]
σa Tech. std. 0.0348 0.0129 0.012
[0.0278; 0.0424] [0.011; 0.0148] [0.01; 0.014]
σv Policy std. 0.0024 0.0043 0.0033
[0.0022; 0.0027] [0.0031; 0.0055] [0.0025; 0.0041]
σg IS shock std. 0.0024 0.0011 0.0012
[0.0020; 0.0028] [0.0008; 0.0013] [0.0009; 0.0015]
σp Policy (II) std. − 0.1424 0.09
− [0.1198; 0.1652] [0.07; 0.10]
σtp Total St. Dev − − 0.17
(incl. chairman dummy) − [0.16; 0.19]
LL −296 −284 −163
Note: I use 200,000 draws from the posterior to compute the model. Acceptance rates on average were be-
tween 30% to 33%. The log-marginal likelihoods are computed with the harmonic mean estimator presented
in Geweke (1999). “− ” Indicates that the parameter is constrained to equal zero.
For the baseline model without the time-varying policy parameter, the indexation pa-
rameter is high compared to the estimates provided by Justiniano et al. (2011). Estimates
of the Calvo parameter and the degree of relative risk aversion are also on the higher side
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compared to the standard literature, but they are in line with the estimates provided by
Ascari et al. (2011). The parameters for Calvo and the relative risk aversion are precisely
estimated, and their distributions appear to cover a narrow range of available estimates us-
ing macro data. The results of the estimated model with the time-varying monetary policy
rule match the broader evidence considered in the literature. The estimated values of the
other structural parameters are also close to what have been proposed in the literature. The
evidence suggests that the model with the time-varying parameter better explains the data.
The estimated policy parameters suggest an aggressive, gradually implemented, long-run
reaction of the Federal Reserve to fluctuations in inflation, which is close to existing literature
(Benati and Surico (2009), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Clarida et al. (1998b) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004b)). However, the model without trend inflation in the policy rule is unable
to capture the high long-run response to inflation. This could possibly be due to the inclusion
of trend inflation in explaining the dynamics during the Great Moderation (Qureshi (2015)),
and due to the conditions imposed on determinacy (Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)). The
policy parameter indicates a high degree of persistence, and a standard deviation three times
larger than the exogenous policy shock.23 As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the estimated
persistence of the structural shocks is very large in both models. Shocks to output and the
nominal interest rate are relatively less volatile, but shocks to the IS curve are persistent in
all three models.
Estimates of the model with the dummy variable provide an interesting insight into the
behavior of policy parameters during the quarters corresponding to changes of the chairmen.
The results of the estimation attribute a little under half of the total volatility in policy
parameters to changes in the chairmen. This suggests that while the policy parameters may
have shifted due to reasons other than due to changes of the chairmen, volatility specifically
due to the appointment of a new chairman is an important source of changes in the policy
parameter.
Finally, the modified harmonic mean estimator is used to calculate the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and to identify the model
that best fits the data. My results suggest that a model with a time-varying parameter rule
fits the data better than a model without this shock, even when penalizing the additional
information present in a time-varying model. Interestingly, the model that takes into consid-
23Excluding the sample from 1979 to 1982 reduces the difference between the two models presenting
evidence related to time-varying monetary policy and the Great Moderation (see, for example, Qureshi
(2015)). This highlights the fact that the framework’s inclusion of shocks to the policy parameter is able
capture major changes in monetary policy, implying that major changes in monetary policy can be captured
in this framework that includes shocks to the policy parameter. However, the main quantitative results of
my paper do not change significantly even when explicitly accounting for this break.
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eration changes in preferences of the chairman by including a dummy variable fits the data
better than the simple time-varying model. One possible justification for this result may be
due to the fact that the inclusion of both the time-varying parameters in the policy rule and
trend inflation in the model better captures the dynamics of inflation. Table 5 presents this
evidence.
Table 5: Model Fit
Model Parameters LL BIC AIC
Fixed 12 −296 653 616
Bias 14 −284 639 596
Bias (D) 15 −163 253 296
Note: The table presents the fit of the three model. The row “Fixed” represents the likelihood of the model
with a constant monetary policy rule, the row “Bias” presents the model with no dummy, while the row “Bias
(D)” presents the fit of the model which includes the dummy variable.
4.2. Numerical Analysis
What are the numerical properties of the policy shock? These properties are best explained
by looking at the basic workings of the model, illustrated by tracing out impulse response
functions generated by the estimated model. To explain the contribution of changes in the
policy parameter relative to the other structural shocks in the economy, I later focus on the
variance decomposition of these shocks. For the purposes of this section, I use the estimated
parameters generated by the ‘extended model’ (Model - II).
Based on the estimated model, an exogenous innovation to the interest rate works to
increase the annualized short-term nominal interest rate by about 10 basis points, and keeps
the interest rate above its steady-state level for six quarters. This generates a fall in inflation
and output by 25 and 13 basis points, respectively.
The monetary authority accommodates productivity shocks, thereby allowing a large
variation in output, and effectively insulating the effect of this shock on inflation. This
works to reduce interest rates by 4.2 basis points upon impact, leading to a decline of 4.3
basis points in inflation and a rise of 78 basis points in output. The persistent nature of
this shock prevents the macroeconomy from returning to steady state in the three years
considered.
Shocks to aggregate demand work to increase output by 5.7 basis points, causing inflation
to jump up by 15 basis points. This induces a sharp response by the monetary authority
that hikes up interest rates by 24 basis points upon impact, and continues to do so for about
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five periods. Inflation peaks in the third period before gradually returning to steady state,
while the fall in output is larger, and quicker, and returns to steady state in only two periods
preceding the hike in interest rates.
Finally, a positive shock to policy parameter leads to a permanent 9.4-basis-point decline
in nominal interest rates, a 15-basis-point decline in inflation, and a 2-basis-point decline in
output. The mechanism is similar to that of an exogenous policy shock; shocks to the policy
parameter generate changes in the interest rates, which generate fluctuations in inflation
and output. In this particular case, a positive shock makes policy more anti-inflationary but
since the effects of the shock are symmetric, the volatility of inflation will be quantitatively
similar.
However, notice that because the persistence of this shock is sufficiently high, the nominal
rate declines in response to a rise in the policy parameter. This is a result of the downward
adjustment in the nominal rate induced by the decline in inflation. In that case, and despite
the lower nominal rate, the policy shock still has a contractionary effect, though it is absorbed
in this model by the extremely forward-looking Phillips curve. Interest rates continue to fall
for about three periods before gradually returning to steady state. Inflation and output
gradually return to steady state as the effect of this shock returns to steady state. Given the
intuition outlined in Galí (2009) the quantitative similarities between the change in policy
parameter and an exogenous shock to interest rates connect with the findings of Lakdawala
(2016) and offer an alternative perspective on explaining the source of monetary policy
shocks.
The baseline impulse responses are plotted in figure 2. Further details related to the role
of the stochastic process governing policy are explored in section 6.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response: Baseline Estimation
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Note: This figure presents impulse response of each of the model’s four shocks using the parameterization
based on the baseline estimated model. The x-axis and y-axis present the quarterly time period and the
percentage deviations from steady state, respectively.
The effects of these shocks are further elaborated by looking at the forecast variance
decomposition over the short and long horizons, and are summarized in table 6. In both
model variants, both aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks play a minor supporting
role in driving short-run output fluctuations, with the dominant source of movements in
output resulting from technology shocks.24 Monetary policy shocks and changes in the policy
parameter become more important in accounting for movements in the nominal interest
rate. Consequently, aggregate demand and the policy parameter explain the low-frequency
24In the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, other shocks, such as to government spending, consumption
preference and investment shocks are the main drivers of output. These shocks are not separately included
in this model. However, and similar to the findings of Ascari et al. (2011), shocks to government spending,
or IS shocks, are estimated to be less volatile than productivity shocks and therefore do not contribute to
the movements in output in this model.
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movements in inflation; however, the contribution toward macroeconomic variability depends
on the forecast horizons, as expected. Given the persistent nature of shocks to the policy
parameter, it is not surprising that they represent the dominant source of fluctuations in
inflation in the long run. Moreover, since the change in policy is implemented gradually and
expectations have time to adjust, the output effects of the change in interest rates are much
smaller.
Table 6: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Interest Rate Inflation Output
Q Tech. Mon. IS Bias Tech. Mon. IS Bias Tech. Mon. IS Bias
1 2.59 21.31 72.03 4.07 3.86 35.50 45.99 14.65 93.51 4.06 2.35 0.07
4 3.78 6.37 83.75 6.11 5.67 24.26 44.67 25.40 97.91 1.33 0.74 0.02
8 4.89 3.89 83.05 8.17 7.03 18.41 40.25 34.31 98.88 0.71 0.40 0.01
20 7.66 2.76 75.62 13.95 8.85 12.32 30.00 48.83 99.45 0.35 0.20 0.01
40 10.12 2.39 66.76 20.73 9.44 9.05 22.26 59.25 99.63 0.23 0.13 0.00
∞ 11.12 1.96 54.80 32.12 8.08 5.93 14.60 71.39 99.72 0.17 0.1 0.00
Note: The table decomposes the forecast error variance at each horizon into percentages due to each of the
models four shocks.
4.3. Volatility attributed to the Chairman Dummy
In this section, I extract the macroeconomic volatility generated by the policy parameter due
to changes in chairman of the Federal Reserve. To be consistent with the intuition outlined
in sections 3.2 - 3.3, which discuss how the “chairman effect” is extracted from the data, I
focus on version-III of the estimated model for the remainder of this section.
In a simple linear specification, the contribution of a dummy variable is extracted by
subtracting the coefficient on the dummy variable with the coefficient without the dummy
variable. The same technique applies here as well. In the model, the volatility generated by
the policy parameter is tabulated by simulating the model using σtp (the total variation in the
policy parameter) from table 4 in the first step. In the second step, I calculate the volatility
in inflation implied by the model with the time-varying policy parameter, using the value
corresponding to σp in table 4. This then gives estimates of the variance of the shock without
the chairman channel. Finally, I calculate the difference in inflation volatility between these
two parameterizations of the policy shock. This technique yields the additional volatility
attributed to chairman of the central bank.25 Table 7 summarizes these results.
25As argued earlier, the “chairman effect” is extracted using the following relationship σdp = σtp − σp.
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Table 7: Additional Macroeconomic Volatility
Model Interest Rate Inflation Output
Bias 32.12 71.39 0.00
Bias (D) 63.53 90.18 0.02
Difference 32.41 18.79 0.02
Note: The table presents the additional volatility generated due to changes in the chairman. The row “Bias”
presents the forecast variance decompositions by the model with no dummy (σp), while the row “Bias (D)”
(σtp) presents the forecast variance decompositions including the dummy variable. The additional volatility
is the calculation based on σdp in model-III.
Focusing first on the model without the chairman dummy, changes in the policy param-
eter explain approximately 71.39 percent of the volatility in inflation, 32.12 percent of the
volatility in the interest rate. Looking at the total volatility, including that generated by the
chairman dummy, amounts to 90.18 percent of the volatility in inflation, 63.53 percent of
the volatility in the interest rate, and 0.02 percent of the volatility in output. Therefore, the
additional volatility generated by the shocks to the policy parameter due to changes in the
chairman of the Federal Reserve explains approximately 18.79 percent of the volatility in in-
flation, 32.41 percent of the volatility in the interest rate and 0.02 percent of the volatility in
output. In the context of my framework, the chairman effect is found to generate significant
macroeconomic variability.
To study the counterfactual inflation volatility when chairman turnover rates are varied,
I simulate the model in which the structural and policy parameters of the model are kept
fixed and only the shock to the policy parameter is varied. Intuitively, this reflects higher or
lower chairman turnover rate, thereby generating macroeconomic volatility for different lev-
els of CBI. In the limiting case, σdp , which captures the “chairman effect” from the following
relationship σdp = σtp − σp, is restricted to zero. σdp = 0.025 corresponds to the counter-
factual scenario where there is approximately 1 governor change in the data series, σdp =
0.05 corresponds to the counterfactual scenario where there are approximately 2 governor
changes. Finally, σdp = 0.125 captures approximately 6 changes in chairman. In each case
the additional volatility is calculated using the same methodology as done to calculate the
volatility presented in table 7.
Table 8 summarises the macroeconomic volatility under each of these counterfactual sce-
narios. The corresponding relationship suggests that higher frequency of changes in the
policy parameter (implying frequent changes in the chairman) would result in additional in-
flation volatility, holding constant the structure of the model and the composition of shocks.
The opposite statement also holds: lower frequency of changes in the policy parameter
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Table 8: Counterfactual Volatility (%)
Parameter Inflation Volatility
Counterfactual (σdp = 0) 0
Counterfactual (σdp = 0.025) 8.82
Counterfactual (σdp = 0.05) 14.3
Counterfactual (σdp = 0.075) 17.85
Benchmark (σdp = 0.0874) 18.79
Counterfactual (σdp = 0.1) 20.26
Counterfactual (σdp = 0.125) 22.96
Note: The table presents the counterfactual volatility generated due to changes in the chairman. The model
is simulated keeping fixed the parameters and the shock to the policy parameter is varied to reflect higher
or lower chairman turnover rate, and thus taken to imply different levels of CBI.
(implying less frequent changes in the chairman) would result in lower inflation volatility,
holding constant the structure of the model and the composition of shocks. The model
therefore presents a plausible channel that reveals the effect of different levels of chairman
changes on macroeconomic dynamics. Indeed, a higher replacement of governors generates
higher volatility, assuming, rather strongly, that each change in leadership causes a change in
the parameters. The next section relaxes this assumption and identifies the types of changes
that lead to executive capture of the central bank.
5. Counterfactual Analysis
The next section extends the benchmark quarterly estimation procedure and confirms evi-
dence of the chairman effect across countries. In 5.2, I further disaggregate among the type
of chairman changes to identify the independence mechanism.
5.1. Cross-Country Investigation
Do the results of the previous section carry over to other countries examined in the panel
specification? That is, does the same theoretical model validate the existence of the chairman
turnover channel across countries? And, does the model shed light on the relationship
between the chairman turnover rate and the frequency of shifts in the policy parameters?
To answer these questions, I re-estimate the model for all countries in the data sample
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described in section 2.26 To identify the chairman effect, I limit the estimation procedure
to the version of the model with the monetary policy rule and the chairman dummy, i.e.,
model - III. Following the same methodology detailed in the previous section, I extract
the chairman effect by comparing the difference in model-implied standard deviation of
the policy shock with and without the dummy variable. This captures the shifts in the
policy parameter generated by changes in the chairman of the individual central bank. The
theoretical model can then be used to draw inferences about the magnitude of macroeconomic
volatility generated by this shock.
The model is estimated using Bayesian estimation techniques using three quarterly country-
specific time series: log of gross rate of the GDP deflator/CPI, the log deviation of real
GDP/production index with respect to its long run trend, and the key central bank pol-
icy rate. As before, I include a fourth series that contains information pertaining to the
chairman dummy, and which consists of values zero and one, with one specified against
the quarters corresponding to changes in the chairman of the country-specific central bank.
Data on chairman appointment dates are constructed using the information available on the
websites of the country-specific central bank. The baseline calibration of the model for the
fixed parameters, such as for β and trend inflation p¯i, are also adjusted to correspond to
country-specific values. To match the relationship between chairman TOR from the data
and the model, I recalculate the TOR from the quarterly data used in the country-specific
models’ Bayesian estimation. Estimation of the parameters of the model using the quarterly
data generates the estimated (model-implied) chairman effect.
Table 9 presents evidence to validate the existence of the chairman turnover channel across
countries. The estimated frequency of shift in the policy parameters is significantly differ-
ent from zero, and varies considerably across countries. Second, comparing the estimated
chairman effect in advanced countries with developing countries suggests that on average,
the frequency of change in the policy parameter is greater in countries with higher turnover
rate. As an example, consider France, where the average turnover rate is 0.155, and the
estimated chairman effect is 0.0731, and Uruguay, where the average turnover rate is 0.388,
and the model-implied chairman effect is 0.2887. A similar pattern is observed across other
countries in the data sample. Second, for both advanced and developing economies, the
average number of times the policy parameter changes is roughly equal to the turnover rate.
The framework is, by construction, unable to distinguish whether each change in governor
resulted in a shift in the parameter, or whether a few governors were responsible for the
entire estimated volatility in the policy parameter.
26Data on the frequency of central bank TOR are consistent with the series described in section 2. Results
from the estimation of the complete model for each country are shared in appendix A.6.
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Table 9: Cross-Country Estimates of Chairman Effect
Advanced Countries Developing Countries
Baseline Estimated Estimated Baseline Estimated Estimated
turnover turnover Chairman turnover turnover Chairman
ratio of central ratio of central Effect ratio of central ratio of central Effect
Country bank governor bank governor σdp Country bank governor bank governor σdp
Australia 0.143 0.148 0.1887 Albania 0.333 0.181 0.2075
Austria 0.192 0.164 0.1998 Argentina 0.800 0.421 0.298
Belgium 0.115 0.117 0.167 Bulgaria 0.200 0.203 0.2195
Canada 0.114 0.094 0.0886 Chile 0.429 0.181 0.2068
Czech Republic 0.200 0.181 0.2099 China 0.214 0.181 0.1771
Denmark 0.143 0.174 0.1845 Hungary 0.188 0.216 0.229
Finland 0.115 0.149 0.1511 India 0.286 0.14 0.1845
France 0.192 0.155 0.0731 Indonesia 0.143 0.258 0.246
Germany 0.115 0.242 0.2336 Jamaica 0.286 0.000 0.000
Greece 0.276 0.151 0.187 Lithuania 0.273 0.000 0.000
Italy 0.115 0.073 0.0758 Malaysia 0.143 0.174 0.2032
Japan 0.200 0.211 0.182 Mexico 0.114 0.064 0.1222
Malta 0.250 0.286 0.2638 Pakistan 0.229 0.248 0.2428
Netherlands 0.077 0.044 0.0969 Philippines 0.171 0.137 0.1731
New Zealand 0.143 0.128 0.1754 Poland 0.313 0.151 0.1863
Norway 0.114 0.136 0.1791 Romania 0.063 0.145 0.2353
Slovak Republic 0.182 0.186 0.2107 Russia 0.286 0.162 0.1968
Spain 0.172 0.151 0.195 South Africa 0.086 0.103 0.0634
Sweden 0.171 0.14 0.183 Thailand 0.257 0.372 0.2973
United Kingdom 0.114 0.092 0.0866 Turkey 0.286 0.289 0.2657
United States 0.114 0.14 0.0842 Uruguay 0.371 0.388 0.2887
Average 0.155 0.151 0.1608 Average 0.255 0.191 0.194
Note: The table summarizes the baseline central bank TOR described in section 2, the estimated TOR
computed for the country-specific sample used in the quarterly estimation of the model, and the estimated
chairman effect computed from the model. The two countries in bold did not experience any chairmanship
changes during the period considered.
The results validate the existence of the chairman effect across countries, and highlight the
relationship between chairman turnover rate and frequency of shifts in the policy parameter
from the quarterly country specific data. The next section isolates the degree of central
bank independence based on types of governor appointments, connecting it with shifts in
the policy parameter.
5.2. Types of Governor Changes, Policy Shifts and
Macroeconomic Instability
Next, I isolate the “independence effect” from the aggregate “chairman effect”. I differ-
entiate voluntary exits that are part of the naturally occurring process of the labor sup-
ply/attachment decisions of central bank governors from the involuntary departures asso-
ciated with central bank governors who are perceived as challengers by the government. I
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also identify whether central bank governor replacements have strong ties with the govern-
ment. In the model, a shift in the policy parameters due to this change represents a central
bank that has been captured by the executive. A broad literature attempts to distinguish
between types of govenors: Adolph (2013) shows that left- and right-wing governments tend
to appoint central bankers with different monetary preferences. Fernández-Albertos (2015)
surveying 24 central banks find that even the most independent central bank does not op-
erate in a political vacuum. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) uses data on the partisan
back-ground of 195 central bank governors in 30 European countries between 1945 and 2012
to test whether partisan congruence between governors and the executive (the government
or the president) is associated with a higher probability of governor turnover. The author
finds that partisan ties to the government strongly increase a governor’s odds of survival
vis-à-vis nonpartisan and opposition-affiliated individuals. The classification of the type of
chairman in the current paper builds on work by Vuletin and Zhu (2011).
For each of the 42 countries, I discern whether or not each central bank governor was
replaced prematurely, that is, before the expiration of his/her official first term in office.
Premature changes are more likely to be associated with involuntary departures of central
bank governors perceived as challengers by the government. For this purpose, I combine
changes in central bank governor data with the length of the legal term of office of central
bank governor, which is available on the central bank websites. Second, I capture whether
or not each central bank governor’s replacement was directly employed by any ministry
or top government agency that relates to the economy, commerce, trade, or industry in
the executive branch within the previous one-year frame, as also done in Vuletin and Zhu
(2011).27 Arguably, hiring someone as a central bank governor who is, at the time of the
hiring, the highest official in any of these ministries or government agencies represents the
clearest case of central bank “capture.” Excluding these changes from the aggregate turnover
series represents those governors who represent executive branch capture of the central bank
(or “premature” and “ally” type governors). The data on the type of chairman are, obviously,
a subset of the total changes in the governor of the central bank of each country.
I re-estimate the model for the 42 countries including a fourth series that contains infor-
mation pertaining to the “type of chairman dummy” which summarizes the “independence
effect.” Further categorizing the changes in chairman into regular changes versus those that
signal the executive branch capture of the central bank reveals the frequency of changes in
27The use of a one-year time frame restriction allows the most obvious cases of dependency to come to
light. If, for example, the central bank governor’s replacement happened to have been the minister of finance
10 years before becoming a central banker, it would not necessarily have been clear that this replacement
would have involved the capture of the central bank in hands of the executive branch.
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the policy parameter when the government appoints a subservient central bank governor
to exploit the inflation-output trade-off. The theoretical model, in particular the results
from table 8, can then be used to draw inferences about the magnitude of macroeconomic
volatility generated by this shock.
Table 10 summarizes three results. The first and second columns in front of the “country”
variable present the estimated TOR rate based on the quarterly data set, and the chairman
effect, respectively. The third column presents the key mechanism; it outlines estimates of
the chairman effect once non-premature and non-ally changes are excluded from the data on
governor changes. The results confirm evidence of the independence channel: once regular
and non-ally changes are excluded, there is still reasonable evidence of shifts in the policy
parameters.
Table 10: Cross-Country Estimates of Chairman Effect
Advanced Countries Developing Countries
Estimated Estimated Excluding Estimated Estimated Excluding
turnover Chairman Non-Premature turnover Chairman Non-Premature
ratio of central Effect and Non-Ally ratio of central Effect and Non-Ally
Country bank governor σdp Changes Country bank governor σdp Changes
Australia 0.148 0.1887 0.0000 Albania 0.181 0.2075 0.0000
Austria 0.164 0.1998 0.1828 Argentina 0.421 0.298 0.298
Belgium 0.117 0.167 0.1295 Bulgaria 0.203 0.2195 0.1098
Canada 0.094 0.0886 0.0068 Chile 0.181 0.2068 0.0000
Czech Republic 0.181 0.2099 0.2099 China 0.181 0.1771 0.1157
Denmark 0.174 0.1845 0.1121 Hungary 0.216 0.229 0.1974
Finland 0.149 0.1511 0.0266 India 0.14 0.1845 0.1845
France 0.155 0.0731 0.0000 Indonesia 0.258 0.246 0.1762
Germany 0.242 0.2336 0.2079 Jamaica 0.000 0.000 0.0000
Greece 0.151 0.187 0.187 Lithuania 0.000 0.000 0.0000
Italy 0.073 0.0758 0.0311 Malaysia 0.174 0.2032 0.1425
Japan 0.211 0.182 0.0218 Mexico 0.064 0.1222 0.1222
Malta 0.286 0.2638 0.0141 Pakistan 0.248 0.2428 0.2158
Netherlands 0.044 0.0969 0.0000 Philippines 0.137 0.1731 0.1276
New Zealand 0.128 0.1754 0.0000 Poland 0.151 0.1863 0.1863
Norway 0.136 0.1791 0.0878 Romania 0.145 0.2353 0.184
Slovak Republic 0.186 0.2107 0.0000 Russia 0.162 0.1968 0.2284
Spain 0.151 0.195 0.0000 South Africa 0.103 0.0634 0.0000
Sweden 0.14 0.183 0.1265 Thailand 0.372 0.2973 0.2564
United Kingdom 0.092 0.0866 0.0000 Turkey 0.289 0.2657 0.0000
United States 0.14 0.0842 0.0000 Uruguay 0.388 0.2887 0.2324
Average 0.151 0.1608 0.063 Average 0.191 0.1948 0.1322
Note: The table summarizes the baseline central bank TOR described in section 2, the estimated TOR
computed for the country-specific sample used in the quarterly estimation of the model, and the estimated
chairman effect computed from the model. The countries in bold did not experience any “Excluding Non
Premature and Non Ally” type changes in chairmanship for the period considered.
Reasonable heterogeneity exists across countries. The average frequency of changes in
policy parameters once a governor exits prematurely or is appointed by an ally of the gov-
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ernment is higher in developing countries (68 percent) as compared to advanced economies
(39 percent). As expected, in certain advanced economies, such as the United Kingdom,
the United States, Austria and the Netherlands, there is no evidence of this effect. Moving
to developing countries, there is sufficient evidence of premature exists and replacement of
governors from the executive branch of the government, resulting in more frequent changes
in the policy parameter. The results from table 10 also suggest that this mechanism is more
prevalent in Argentina, as each change in leadership is estimated to have resulted in a change
in the policy parameter. For other developing countries, such as Bulgaria or Malaysia, only
half of changes in leadership corresponded to an exploitation of the inflation-output trade-off.
These results provide evidence of a channel through which the independence of a central
bank is compromised due to a change in the policy parameter to exploit the inflation-output
trade-off. Connecting the results of table 10 with the theoretical framework in particular,
the counterfactual volatility generated in table 8, this mechanism is a significant source of
inflation volatility. In fact, 25 percent of the inflation volatility in developing countries is due
to this mechanism, which is estimated based on the average change in the policy parameter
(setting σdp = 0.1322) versus only about 15 percent of the volatility in inflation in developed
economies (setting σdp = 0.063). For individual countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay and
Thailand, the additional volatility from this mechanism may be as high as 40 percent of
the total inflation volatility. For other countries, such as the United States, and the United
Kingdom, even though there is strong evidence of a “chairman effect,” the “independence
effect” goes not play any role in generating macroeconomic volatility.28 The results suggest
that the channel through which the government appoints a subservient central bank governor
to exploit the inflation-output trade-off results in a shift in the policy parameters, generating
macroeconomic volatility.
I perform a robustness check to verify these results. I estimate the relationship between
the model-implied chairman effect and the estimation consistent turnover rate compared to
the baseline TOR used in the panel estimation. This relationship illustrates the frequency of
change in the policy parameter due to changes in the chairmanship; a one-to-one relationship
between the estimated turnover rate and the model-implied chairman would imply that each
change in the chairman corresponded to a shift in the policy parameter.
Table 11 compares the relationship between the model-implied chairman effect with TOR
from the actual data. The results reveal a positive relationship between the frequency of
28As pointed out in the NYT quote in the beginning of this paper, the situation may change given the
current Trump-Yellen dynamic. Conditional on President Trump appointing a Chairman more inclined to
growth in the future, the model will permit me to identify whether a shift in policy parameters did indeed
take place.
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change in policy objectives and chairman turnover rate. However, this relationship is stronger
when the model-consistent chairman turnover rate is used. This is expected since the esti-
mated TOR is captured from the data used in the model’s estimation procedure. Consistent
with the estimates presented in tables 9 and 10, the results suggest that of the total changes
in chairmanships, more than half the changes in the central bank leadership generated a shift
in the policy parameter
Table 11: Model-implied vs. data-implied TOR
All All
σdp countries countries
TOR 0.275*** −
(baseline) [0.064] −
TOR − 0.6346***
(estimated) − [0.601]
R-squared 0.32 0.73
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the model-implied chairman turnover rate. Constant coefficients are not
reported. Standard errors are computed using robust standard errors.
The hypothesis, that the government can create surprise variability in inflation by chang-
ing the weight on policy objectives through the appointment of a new chairman, is found
to be robust when examined across countries. Furthermore, empirical analysis of a large set
of countries suggests that the type of chairman change is positively related to the frequency
of shifts in the policy parameter. Indeed, by using information regarding premature exits
and whether the replacement is an ally of the government, I am able to explicitly identify
“executive capture” of the central bank. Estimating this model using quarterly data on 42
advanced and developing economies explains approximately 25 percent of the total volatility
in inflation in developing economies, and 15 percent of the total volatility in inflation in
advanced economies. In this sense, the findings extend the policy literature (Eijffinger and
Hoeberichts (2008), Bernanke (2010), Adolph (2013), Taylor (2013), Levieuge and Lucotte
(2014)) by suggesting that the nature of appointment of central bank chairmen may need to
be further investigated. Klomp and de Haan (2010) reach similar conclusions.
6. Analytical Investigation
Explicitly modelling policy as varying over time enables me to explore questions related to
the role of the stochastic process governing the policy parameter. This added sophistication
outlines a deeper mechanism at work, highlighting important features of the model. I focus
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on investigating the propagation mechanism of a shocks to the policy parameter, I derive
analytical expressions for the impact on inflation, output and interest rates.29 The results
of the analytical analysis below are presented in figure 3. Similar to Galí (2009), I use the
method of undetermined coefficients to calculate the response of interest rates, inflation and
output to a change in the policy parameter:
it = Λ3Φpip¯i
ssφpi,t (8)
pit = − Λ2
Λ2(Φpi − ρp)− Λ1σ(ρp − 1)Φpip¯i
ssφpi,t (9)
yt = − Λ1
Λ2(Φpi − ρp)− Λ1σ(ρp − 1)Φpip¯i
ssφpi,t (10)
Here Λ1 = (1 − θβp¯i(1−χ)(−1)ρp)((ρp − θp¯i(1−χ)())(1 − (βp¯i1−χ + η( − 1))ρp) − λϕρpξ) −
ηρ2pθβp¯i
(1−χ)(−1)(−1)(ρp−θp¯i(1−χ)()), Λ2 = (ρp−θp¯i(1−χ)())(κ(1−θβp¯i(1−χ)(−1)ρp)+ηρp(1−
σ)(1− θβp¯i(1−χ)(−1))) and Λ3 = 1 + Λ2ΦpiΛ2(Φpi−ρp)−Λ1σ(ρp−1) .
Based on the solutions outlined in equations (8) – (10), I can infer important results
pertaining to the propagation mechanism of the policy shock. The following analysis is also
highlighted in figure 3 and 4.
Larger Shock to Policy parameters A larger change in policy generates a larger move-
ment in interest rates and, therefore, larger changes in inflation and output. Notice that
in the baseline case, interest rates move by 7-basis points to a 14-basis-point shock to the
inflation bias, compared to the10-basis-point movement to a 20-basis point-shock, and 25-
basis-point movement to a 50-basis-point shock.
Steady State Inflation The analytical expressions suggest that the effect of changes
in the policy parameter on the interest rate, inflation and output is positively related to
steady state inflation. Since steady state inflation is multiplied with the policy shock, higher
gross steady state inflation leads to a larger change in the interest rate, resulting in a more
volatile path for inflation.30 Therefore, if the monetary authority switches its preferences
on inflation from a region where trend inflation is high, it will generate a larger impact on
inflation volatility, as compared to the effects of this shock when steady state inflation is
29To illustrate the effect of changes in policy, I set Φy and Φi to zero in order to obtain these expressions.
The main results are robust to including these parameters. For the rest of this section, I calibrate the model
based on the estimation of the full model.
30This relationship is also verified by taking the first derivatives of the expression with respect to steady
state inflation, dpitdp¯iss .
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relatively lower. Moreover, setting steady state (gross) inflation to one implies that p¯iss is
zero. Under this parameterization, the impact of a shock in the policy parameter will tend
to zero, and a change in this parameter would have no effect on the macro dynamics of the
economy. This result implies that nonzero trend inflation serves as a crucial propagating
mechanism in this model.
Weight on Inflation Analogous to the case with high trend inflation, Φpi is multiplied
with this shock, and is therefore increasing in the magnitude of the change in interest rates.
This implies that when the mean response to inflation is large, a change in policy has a
greater impact on the volatility of output, inflation and interest rates, as compared to a case
when the mean response is lower.31 This mechanism can be extended to study a central
bank that adjusts interest rates gradually. In that case, the aggregate response to inflation
will be multiplied with the coefficient on the lagged interest rate, and will therefore decrease
the effect of the shock to the policy parameter.
Role of Persistence Varying the degree of persistence in the shock to the policy parameter
reveal several interesting and novel insights. First, notice that as the persistence of the shock
rises, interest rates rise by less, output falls by less, and inflation falls by significantly more.
If the persistence of the policy parameter is sufficiently high, the nominal rate will decline in
response to a rise in φpi,t. This is a result of the downward adjustment in the nominal rate
induced by the decline in inflation. In that case, and despite the lower nominal rate, the
policy shock still has a contractionary effect, though this shock is absorbed in this model by
the extremely forward-looking Phillips curve. Numerical analysis suggest that the response
to interest rates switches when ρp is between 0.60 - 0.70. In the baseline case, interest rates
fall by 9 basis points, when ρp is set to 0.93. In comparison, interest rates fall by 8 basis
points when ρp is set to 0.5, and rise by 0.4 basis points when ρp is set to 0.25.
31This relationship is also verified by taking the first derivatives of the expression with respect to the
average response of the central bank to inflation, dpitdΦpi .
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Figure 3: Analytical Investigation: Policy Parameter
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Note: This figure presents impulse responses of inflation and output to the policy parameters when the
volatility of the shock is varied (panel 1), trend inflation is varied (panel 2), the average response to inflation
is varied (panel 3), and when the persistence is varied (panel 4). The x-axis presents the quarterly time
period and the y-axis presents percentage deviations from the steady state.
Comparison with a Time Varying Inflation Target Last, I compare the effect of a
shock to the policy parameter with a time-varying inflation target. I compare the baseline
policy rule with the following:
it = Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)[Φpi(pit − piTt ) + Φyyt] + vt (11)
The inflation target is allowed to follow an AR(1) process centred around steady state in-
flation, p¯i, and is calibrated with the values presented in Ireland (2005). Figure 4 plots the
impact of these two shocks on output, interest rates and inflation.
First, looking at the baseline effects, a positive shock to the inflation target acts similarly
38
to an expansionary monetary policy shock, raising inflation and output. This causes interest
rates to gradually rise. On the other hand, a positive shock to the policy parameter behaves
similar to a contractionary monetary policy shock, and causes output and inflation to fall.
Looking at the second panel, which normalizes each shock, further highlights the charac-
teristics these two policies. Primarily the effect of the shock to the inflation target is more
persistent compared to the shock to the policy parameter as inflation, output and interest
rates fall quickly compared to the gradual movements in inflation, output and interest rates
generated by the shock to the inflation target.
Figure 4: Analytical Investigation: Policy Parameter vs. Inflation Target
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Note: This figure presents impulse responses of inflation and output to the policy parameters and the inflation
target. The x-axis presents the quarterly time period and the y-axis presents percentage deviations from
the steady state. The solid black line outlines the effect of the shock to the inflation target and the red line
(with diamonds) outlines the effect of the shock to the policy parameter.
While a shock to policy, and a shock to the inflation target generate different interest rate
dynamics as highlighted in the first panel of figure 4, they can be categorized as observa-
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tionally equivalent, as seen in the second panel of the same figure. In this sense, the shock
to policy generates economically significant welfare effects.
Broadly, the modeling exercise extends the literature on two fronts. First, it contributes
to the literature that has thus far focused solely on the effect of changes in these parameters
on determinacy and on policy activeness (Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. (1998a), Orphanides
(2002), Boivin (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004a), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
and Foerster (2016)), and has yet to connect shocks to the policy parameter and macroeco-
nomic volatility along the lines of Roberts (2006), and Canova et al. (2010).
Second, the analytical results, such as the crucial role of positive trend inflation and
the average weight on the policy parameter as propagation mechanisms to the policy shock
present several interesting insights and areas for future work. For example, combining these
theoretical results with the historical evolution of the policy shock contributes to the exten-
sive research on the changes in the conduct of monetary policy, the transmission mechanism,
and the structural and policy shocks in the U.S. (Clarida et al. (1998a), Cogley and Sbor-
done (2008), Sims and Zha (2006), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Primiceri (2005b), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Bhattarai et al. (2016)). The
quantitative similarities between shifts in policy parameters and exogenous shocks to interest
rates connect with the findings of Lakdawala (2016), offering an alternative perspective on
explaining the source of monetary policy shocks.
7. Conclusions
This paper identifies a formal mechanism that may explain the reduction in macroeconomic
instability due to greater central bank independence.
I propose that the government can create surprise variability in inflation by frequently
changing the weight on policy objectives through the appointment of a new chairman. In
a New Keynesian framework, frequency of policy shifts is connected with a “chairman ef-
fect.” To identify departures from full independence, I classify chairmen based on tenure
(premature exits), and the type of successor (whether the replacement is a government ally).
Bayesian estimation using cross-country data confirms the relationship between policy shifts
and central bank independence. The results show that executive capture explains approxi-
mately 25 percent of the total volatility in inflation in developing economies, and 15 percent
of the total volatility in inflation in advanced economies. The policy implications from the
paper urge revisiting of the appointment procedures to mitigate this channel, and ensure
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price stability.
Explicitly modelling policy using a time-varying parameter approach highlights several
interesting and important features of the model. The crucial role of positive trend inflation
and the average weight on the policy parameter as propagation mechanisms to the policy
shock present several interesting insights and areas for future work. The quantitative sim-
ilarities between the change in policy parameter and an exogenous shock to interest rates
offer an alternative perspective on explaining the source of monetary policy shocks. Devot-
ing more effort to explaining the role of time-varying parameters in medium-to-large scale
DSGE models, and studying the implications of possibly time-varying shifts in the stochastic
process on historical U.S. macroeconomic volatility may be of interest to future researchers.
41
References
Adolph, Christopher, Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics: The myth of neu-
trality, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Aisen, Ari and Francisco José Veiga, “Does political instability lead to higher inflation?
A panel data analysis,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2006, 38 (5), 1379–1389.
and , “Political instability and inflation volatility,” Public Choice, 2008, 135 (3-4),
207–223.
Aiyagari, S Rao and Mark Gertler, “The backing of government bonds and monetarism,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 1985, 16 (1), 19–44.
Alesina, Alberto F and Andrea Stella, “The politics of monetary policy,” Technical
Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.
Alpanda, Sami and Adam Honig, “The impact of central bank independence on the
performance of inflation targeting regimes,” Journal of International Money and Finance,
2014, 44, 118–135.
An, Sungbae and Frank Schorfheide, “Bayesian analysis of DSGE models,” Econometric
reviews, 2007, 26 (2-4), 113–172.
Artha, IKDS and Jakob Haan, “Financial crises and the dismissal of central bank gover-
nors: new evidence,” International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2015, 20 (1), 80–95.
Ascari, Guido, “Staggered prices and trend inflation: some nuisances,” Review of Economic
dynamics, 2004, 7 (3), 642–667.
and Argia M Sbordone, “The macroeconomics of trend inflation,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 2014, 52 (3), 679–739.
and Tiziano Ropele, “Trend inflation, taylor principle, and indeterminacy,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 2009, 41 (8), 1557–1584.
, Efrem Castelnuovo, and Lorenza Rossi, “Calvo vs. Rotemberg in a trend inflation
world: An empirical investigation,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2011, 35
(11), 1852–1867.
Ball, Laurence M and Niamh Sheridan, “Does inflation targeting matter?,” in “The
inflation-targeting debate,” University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 249–282.
42
Barro, Robert J and David B Gordon, “Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of
monetary policy,” Journal of monetary economics, 1983, 12 (1), 101–121.
Benati, Luca, “Investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2008, 123 (3), 1005–1060.
and Paolo Surico, “VAR Analysis and the Great Moderation,” American Economic
Review, 2009, 99 (4), 1636–52.
Bernanke, Ben S, “Central bank independence, transparency, and accountability,” in
“Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference,
Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, May,” Vol. 25 2010.
Bhattarai, Saroj, Jae Won Lee, and Woong Yong Park, “Policy regimes, policy shifts,
and US business cycles,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016, 98 (5), 968–983.
Blanchard, Olivier and John Simon, “The long and large decline in US output volatility,”
Brookings papers on economic activity, 2001, 2001 (1), 135–174.
Boivin, Jean, “Has US Monetary Policy Changed? Evidence from Drifting Coefficients and
Real-Time Data,” NBER Working Papers 11314, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc May 2005.
and Marc P Giannoni, “Has monetary policy become more effective?,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 2006, 88 (3), 445–462.
Bowdler, Christopher and Adeel Malik, “Openness and inflation volatility: Panel data
evidence,” University of Oxford. Working paper, 2005.
Calvo, Guillermo A, “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework,” Journal of
monetary Economics, 1983, 12 (3), 383–398.
Canova, Fabio, David Lopez-Salido, and Claudio Michelacci, “The effects of technol-
ogy shocks on hours and output: A robustness analysis,” Journal of Applied Econometrics,
2010, 25 (5), 755–773.
Cecchetti, Stephen G and Michael Ehrmann, “Does inflation targeting increase out-
put volatility? An international comparison of policymakers’ preferences and outcomes,”
Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 1999.
Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democ-
racy and dictatorship revisited,” Public choice, 2010, 143 (1-2), 67–101.
43
Cihak, Martin, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik Feyen, and Ross Levine, “Benchmarking
financial systems around the world,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2012,
(6175).
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroe-
conomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” NBER Working Papers 6442, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc March 1998.
, , and , “Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence,” European
Economic Review, June 1998, 42 (6), 1033–1067.
Cogley, Timothy and Argia M. Sbordone, “Trend Inflation, Indexation, and Inflation
Persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” American Economic Review, 2008, 98
(5), 2101–26.
and Thomas J Sargent, “Drifts and volatilities: monetary policies and outcomes in the
post WWII US,” Review of Economic dynamics, 2005, 8 (2), 262–302.
Coibion, Olivier and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, “Monetary Policy, Trend Inflation, and the
Great Moderation: An Alternative Interpretation,” American Economic Review, 2011, 101
(1), 341–70.
Crowe, Christopher, “Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to dele-
gate,” European Journal of Political Economy, December 2008, 24 (4), 748–762.
Cukierman, Alex, Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence: Theory and evi-
dence, MIT press, 1992.
, Steven BWeb, and Bilin Neyapti, “Measuring the independence of central banks and
its effect on policy outcomes,” The World Bank Economic Review, 1992, 6 (3), 353–398.
Davig, Troy and Eric M Leeper, “Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus,”
European Economic Review, 2011, 55 (2), 211–227.
Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Jakob De Haan, “Does high inflation cause
central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set,” European Journal
of Political Economy, 2008, 24 (4), 778–787.
, , and , “When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data
set,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 2010, 32 (3), 766–781.
44
Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher, “Politics and monetary policy,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 2011, 93 (3), 941–960.
Eijffinger, Sylvester CW and Macro M Hoeberichts, “The trade-off between central
bank independence and conservatism in a New Keynesian framework,” European Journal
of Political Economy, 2008, 24 (4), 742–747.
, Jakob De Haan et al., “The political economy of central-bank independence,” 1996.
Elder, John, “Another perspective on the effects of inflation uncertainty,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 2004, pp. 911–928.
Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz, “Party politics and the survival of central bank governors,”
European Journal of Political Research, 2014, 53 (3), 500–519.
Fatás, Antonio and Ilian Mihov, “Policy volatility, institutions and economic growth,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2005, (0).
Fernández-Albertos, José, “The politics of Central Bank independence,” Annual Review
of Political Science, 2015, 18, 217–237.
Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús and Juan Rubio-Ramirez, “How structural are structural
parameters?,” 2007.
Foerster, Andrew T, “Monetary policy regime switches and macroeconomic dynamics,”
International Economic Review, 2016, 57 (1), 211–230.
Galí, Jordi, Monetary Policy, inflation, and the Business Cycle: An introduction to the
new Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press, 2009.
George, Eddie, Mervyn King, David Clementi, Alan Budd, Willem Buiter,
Charles Goodhart, DeAnne Julius, Ian Plenderleith, and John Vickers, “The
transmission mechanism of monetary policy,” Bank of England, 1999, pp. 1–12.
Geweke, John, “Using simulation methods for Bayesian econometric models: inference,
development, and communication,” Econometric Reviews, 1999, 18 (1), 1–73.
Grier, Robin and Kevin B Grier, “On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty
in Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics, 2006, 80 (2), 478–500.
Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, “Political and monetary
institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries,” Economic policy,
1991, 6 (13), 341–392.
45
Haan, Jakob De and Clemens LJ Siermann, “Political instability, freedom, and eco-
nomic growth: Some further evidence,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1996,
pp. 339–350.
and Willem J Kooi, “Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence
for developing countries using a new indicator,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 2000, 24
(4), 643–664.
Ireland, Peter N., “Changes in the Federal Reserve’s Inflation Target: Causes and Conse-
quences,” Boston College Working Papers in Economics 607, Boston College Department
of Economics January 2005.
Judson, Ruth and Athanasios Orphanides, “Inflation, volatility and growth,” Interna-
tional Finance, 1999, 2 (1), 117–138.
Justiniano, Alejandro and Giorgio E Primiceri, “The time-varying volatility of macroe-
conomic fluctuations,” The American Economic Review, 2008, 98 (3), 604–641.
, , and Andrea Tambalotti, “Investment shocks and the relative price of investment,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2011, 14 (1), 102–121.
Katsimbris, George M, “The relationship between the inflation rate, its variability, and
output growth variability: disaggregated international evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 1985, pp. 179–188.
Keefer, Philip and David Stasavage, “The limits of delegation: Veto players, central
bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy,” American political science
review, 2003, 97 (3), 407–423.
Klomp, Jeroen and Jakob de Haan, “Do central bank law reforms affect the term in
office of central bank governors?,” Economics Letters, 2010, 106 (3), 219–222.
Kumhof, Michael, Ricardo Nunes, and Irina Yakadina, “Simple monetary rules under
fiscal dominance,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2010, 42 (1), 63–92.
Kydland, Finn E and Edward C Prescott, “Rules rather than discretion: The incon-
sistency of optimal plans,” The Journal of Political Economy, 1977, pp. 473–491.
Lakdawala, Aeimit, “Changes in Federal Reserve preferences,” Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control, 2016, 70, 124 – 143.
46
Laurens, Bernard, “Monetary policy implementation at different stages of market devel-
opment,” Technical Report, International Monetary Fund 2005.
Leeper, Eric M, “Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies,”
Journal of monetary Economics, 1991, 27 (1), 129–147.
and Todd B Walker, “Perceptions and misperceptions of fiscal inflation,” Technical
Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2012.
Levieuge, Grégory and Yannick Lucotte, “A simple empirical measure of central banks’
conservatism,” Southern Economic Journal, 2014, 81 (2), 409–434.
Lubik, Thomas A and Frank Schorfheide, “Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application
to US Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, 2004, 94 (1), 190–217.
Lubik, Thomas A. and Frank Schorfheide, “Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application
to U.S. Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, March 2004, 94 (1), 190–217.
Masciandaro, Donato, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of
Neutrality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2014, 52 (1), 223–226.
McConnell, Margaret M and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, “Output Fluctuations in the
United States: What Has Changed since the Early 1980’s?,” American Economic Review,
2000, 90 (5), 1464–1476.
Mishra, Prachi and Peter Montiel, “How effective is monetary transmission in low-
income countries? A survey of the empirical evidence,” Economic Systems, 2013, 37 (2),
187–216.
, Peter J Montiel, and Antonio Spilimbergo, “Monetary transmission in low-income
countries: Effectiveness and policy implications,” IMF Economic Review, 2012, 60 (2),
270–302.
Moser-Boehm, Paul, “The relationship between the central bank and the government,” in
“Central banks and the challenge of development, A special meeting of governors held at
the BIS, Basel” 2006, pp. 14–15.
Norris, Pippa et al., “Driving democracy,” Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work, 2008,
pp. 29–50.
Orphanides, Athanasios, “Monetary-Policy Rules and the Great Inflation,” American
Economic Review, May 2002, 92 (2), 115–120.
47
Posen, Adam S, “Declarations are not enough: financial sector sources of central bank
independence,” in “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10,” MIT Press, 1995,
pp. 253–274.
Posen, Adam S., “Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank
Independence,” in “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10” NBER Chapters,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, september 1995, pp. 253–274.
Primiceri, Giorgio, “Why inflation rose and fell: policymakers’ beliefs and US postwar
stabilization policy,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2005.
Primiceri, Giorgio E, “Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary pol-
icy,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72 (3), 821–852.
Qureshi, Irfan, “What are monetary policy shocks?,” Technical Report 2015.
Reinhart, Carmen M and Kenneth S Rogoff, “The modern history of exchange rate ar-
rangements: a reinterpretation,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research
2002.
Resende, Carlos De, “Cross-country estimates of the degree of fiscal dominance and central
bank independence,” Technical Report, Bank of Canada Working Paper 2007.
Roberts, John M, “Monetary Policy and Inflation Dynamics. International Journal of
Central Banking,” International Journal of Central Banking, 2006, 2 (4), 193–230.
Rogoff, Kenneth, “The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target,”
The quarterly journal of economics, 1985, pp. 1169–1189.
Romer, David et al., “Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1993, 108 (4), 869–903.
Rudebusch, Glenn and Lars EO Svensson, “Policy rules for inflation targeting,” in
“Monetary policy rules,” University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 203–262.
Sargent, Thomas J and Neil Wallace, “Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” in
“Monetarism in the United Kingdom,” Springer, 1984, pp. 15–41.
Sims, Christopher A and Tao Zha, “Were there regime switches in US monetary policy?,”
The American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (1), 54–81.
Smets, Frank and Rafael Wouters, “Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A
Bayesian DSGE approach,” The American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (3), 586–606.
48
et al., “Financial stability and monetary policy: How closely interlinked?,” Sveriges
Riksbank Economic Review, 2013, 3, 121–160.
Stock, James H and Mark W Watson, “Has the business cycle changed and why?,”
NBER macroeconomics annual, 2002, 17, 159–218.
Sturm, Jan-Egbert and Jakob De Haan, “Inflation in developing countries: does Central
Bank independence matter?,” 2001.
Svensson, Lars EO, “Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation
targets,” European economic review, 1997, 41 (6), 1111–1146.
Taylor, John B., “Discretion versus policy rules in practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Confer-
ence Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39 (1), 195–214.
Taylor, John B, “A historical analysis of monetary policy rules,” in “Monetary policy rules,”
University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 319–348.
, “The effectiveness of central bank independence vs. policy rules,” Business Economics,
2013, 48 (3), 155–162.
Tootell, Geoffrey MB, “Whose monetary policy is it anyway?,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 1999, 43 (1), 217–235.
Vanhanen, Tatu, “A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998,” Journal of Peace
Research, 2000, 37 (2), 251–265.
Vuletin, Guillermo and Ling Zhu, “Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor
with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on
Inflation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, 43 (6), 1185–1215.
Woodford, Michael, “Inflation targeting and financial stability,” Technical Report, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research 2012.
49
A. Appendix: for online publication
A.1. Data Sources and Transformations: Panel
Regression
The baseline data on chairman dismissal is compiled by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), and consists
of 42 countries for the period 1972 through to 2006, of which 21 are advanced economies
and 21 are developing countries. The additional variables used to estimate the empirical
specification presented in section 2.2 are described below.
Inflation Date on annual inflation is taken from the Global Financial Data.
Inflation volatility I calculate rolling window of 4 years to calculate standard deviation
of inflation (Bowdler and Malik (2005)) to obtain a measure of inflation variability. My
results are robust for window lengths of 3 and 5 years.
TOR rate Similar to Klomp and de Haan (2010), I calculate the turnover rate (TOR)
using a rolling average over 4 years preceding a central bank governor change. According to
Vuletin and Zhu (2011) using rolling windows to calculate average turnover rate of central
bank governors allows for a more gradual and continuous institutional change. It is important
to remark that because we calculate the rolling average over 4 years preceding a central bank
governor change, we do not include current or future changes of central bank governor in
our current calculation of TOR. This strategy purges reverse causality concerns, a crucial
distinction because Dreher et al. (2008) find that past inflation increases the likelihood of a
central banker to be replaced. My results are robust when calculating TOR over 2,3 and 5
years.
Government Regime Data on ‘Regimes’ is taken from Democracy Time-series Data used
in Norris et al. (2008). The series contains data on the social, economic and political charac-
teristics of 190 countries with over 700 variables from 1971 to 2007. It merges the indicators
of democracy by Freedom House, Vanhanen (2000), Polity IV, and Cheibub et al. (2010),
plus selected institutional classifications and also socio-economic indicators from the World
Bank. This dataset is in a country-year case format and therefore suitable for time-series
analysis.
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Efficiency I use the data on financial efficiency, which is available in the Global Financial
Data, as used in Cihak et al. (2012). This indicator represents the efficiency of financial
intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions.
Since a number of variables can further be categorized under efficiency, I take the mean of
variety of indicators related to efficiency. My results remain robust to a variety of other
indicators representing financial development, such as depth (size of financial institutions
and markets), stability (stability of financial institutions and markets), access (degree to
which individuals can and do use financial services) as well as other factors influencing
financial development.
Output volatility I use real GDP to calculate output volatility, with the underlying data
available in the Global Financial Data. I convert this data into growth rates and calculate
standard deviation of output over rolling window of 4 years to coincide with the baseline
measure of inflation volatility. My results are robust for window lengths of 3 and 5 years.
A.2. Log-linearization
It = Vt(It−1)Φi [Π
Φpi,t
t Y
Φy
t ]
1−Φi (12)
Define ln(Xt) = xt. Therefore;
exp(it) = exp(vt)exp(Φiit−1)exp((1− Φi)exp(φpi,t)(pit))exp((1− φi)exp(φy)(yt)) (13)
Next, I take logs on both sides:
it = vt + Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)(exp(φpi,t)pit + Φyyt) (14)
To be consistent with the quarterly model, this non-linear equation represents quarterly
variables. I now linearize this equation to obtain the time-varying rule in the following form:
it = Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)[Φpi(p¯issφpi,t + pit) + Φyyt] + vt (15)
In this equation, p¯iss represents quarterly steady state inflation and φpi,t is the time-varying
policy parameter. Notice that when trend inflation is zero, p¯iss is zero, and it returns the
following policy rule which is commonly used in the literature:
it = Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)[Φpipit + Φyyt] + vt (16)
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A.3. Data Sources and Transformations: Bayesian
Estimation
The following table summarizes the data used to estimate cross-country model. I outline the
period covered in the estimation process as well as the data source. The complete data set
may be obtained from the online appendix.
Advanced Countries Developing Countries
Data Time Data Time
Country Source Period Country Source Period
Australia FRED/RBA 1968:I - 2008:II Albania INSTAT/BeS 2003:I - 2008:II
Austria FRED/OeNB 1968:I - 2008:II Argentina IFS/CRA 1994:II - 2008:II
Belgium FRED/NBB 1966:I - 2008:II Bulgaria IFS/BNB 1994:I - 2008:II
Canada FRED/BoC 1966:I - 2008:II Chile FRED/CBC 1997:II - 2008:I
Czech Republic FRED/CZB 1992:I - 2008:II China FRBA/PBC 1992:II - 2008:II
Denmark FRED/DNB 1974:I - 2008:II Hungary FRED/MNB 1990:I - 2008:II
Finland FRED/BoF 1975:I - 2008:II India FRED/ISI 1994:II - 2008:II
France FRED/BdF 1970:I - 2008:II Indonesia BSRI 2001.I - 2008:II
Germany FRED/DB 1991:I - 2008:II Jamaica IFS/BoJ 2002.I - 2008:II
Greece FRED/BoG/MoF 1995:I - 2008:II Lithuania IFS/LB 2000.III - 2008:II
Italy FRED/BdI 1981:I - 2008:II Malaysia BNM 1997:I - 2008:II
Japan FRED/BoJ 1966:I - 2008:II Mexico BdM 1993:I - 2008:II
Malta FRED/CBM 1997:I - 2003:IV Pakistan IFS/SBP 1972:II - 2008:II
Netherlands FRED/DNB 1986:I - 2008:II Philippines BSP 1994:I - 2008:II
New Zealand FRED/RBNZ 1977:II - 2008:II Poland FRED/NBP 1995:I - 2008:II
Norway FRED/NB 1979:I - 2008:II Romania BNR 1995:I - 2008:II
Slovak Republic FRED/NBS 1997:II - 2008:II Russia FRED/BoR 1990:I - 2008:II
Spain FRED/BdE 1994:II - 2007:II South Africa FRED/SARB 1960:I - 2008:II
Sweden FRED/RB 1994:I - 2008:II Thailand IFS/BoT 1995:I - 2005:IV
United Kingdom FRED/BoE 1975:IV - 2008:II Turkey FRED/TCMB 1991:II - 2008:II
United States FRED/Fed 1966:I - 2008:II Uruguay FRED/BCU 1981:II - 2007:II
Note: Data on gross real GDP and consumer price index are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis database (FRED), IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) or from the ministry of finance/central
bank of each country. Detailed information about the key central bank policy rate as well as historical
changes in central bank chairman is obtained from the country-specific central bank website. Data used in
the estimation is the longest historical data available for each country. The countries in bold are countries
who do not tack GDP at a quarterly or monthly frequency. For these countries industrial production was
used a proxy instead of GDP. Countries in italics did not experience any changes in chairmanship for the
data period available.
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A.4. Overall Period Turnover and Frequency of Change
in Central Bank Chairman
The following table summarizes the data used to plot figure 1 in the main text. The base-
line data on governor dismissal is compiled by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), and consists of 42
countries for the period 1972 through to 2006, of which 21 are advanced economies and 21
are developing countries.
Advanced Countries Developing Countries
Average Average frequency Average Average frequency
turnover of central bank turnover of central bank
ratio of central governor ratio of central bank governor
Country bank governor replacement Country bank governor replacement
Australia 0.143 7 years Albania 0.333 3 years
Austria 0.192 5 years and 2 months Argentina 0.800 1 year and 3 months
Belgium 0.115 8 years and 8 months Bulgaria 0.200 5 years
Canada 0.114 8 years and 9 months Chile 0.429 2 years and 4 months
Czech Republic 0.200 5 years China 0.214 4 years and 8 months
Denmark 0.143 7 years Hungary 0.188 5 years and 4 months
Finland 0.115 8 years and 8 months India 0.286 3 years and 5 months
France 0.192 5 years and 2 months Indonesia 0.143 7 years
Germany 0.115 8 years and 8 months Jamaica 0.286 3 years and 5 months
Greece 0.276 3 years and 7 months Lithuania 0.273 3 years and 7 months
Italy 0.115 8 years and 8 months Malaysia 0.143 7 years
Japan 0.200 5 years Mexico 0.114 8 years and 9 months
Malta 0.250 4 years Pakistan 0.229 4 years and 4 months
Netherlands 0.077 12 years and 11 months Philippines 0.171 5 years and 9 months
New Zealand 0.143 7 years Poland 0.313 3 years and 2 months
Norway 0.114 8 years and 9 months Romania 0.063 16 years
Slovak Republic 0.182 5 years and 5 months Russia 0.286 3 years and 5 months
Spain 0.172 5 years and 9 months South Africa 0.086 11 years and 7 months
Sweden 0.171 5 years and 9 months Thailand 0.257 3 years and 10 months
United Kingdom 0.114 8 years and 9 months Turkey 0.286 3 years and 5 months
United States 0.114 8 years and 9 months Uruguay 0.371 2 years and 8 months
Average 0.155 6 years and 5 months Average 0.255 3 years and 11 months
53
A.5. Model Parameters and Priors
The following table describes the parameters of the log-linearized DSGE model used in the
text. The priors correspond to those used in Ascari et al. (2011).
Table A.5: Bayesian Estimation
Parameters Description Prior (mean, std)
χ Indexation Beta (0.50, 0.285)
θ Calvo Beta (0.50, 0.15)
σ Risk aversion Normal (2.50, 0.25)
Φpi Taylor rule response to inflation Normal (2.00, 0.50)
Φy Taylor rule response to output Gamma (0.125, 0.05)
Φi Policy persistence Beta (0.50, 0.285)
ρa Technology persistence Gamma (0.90, 0.05)
ρv Policy persistence Beta (0.50, 0.15)
ρg IS persistence Gamma (0.90, 0.05)
ρp Policy (II) persistence Gamma (0.90, 0.05)
σp Policy (II) standard deviation IGamma (0.005, 2.00)
σa Technology standard deviation IGamma (0.005, 2.00)
σv Policy standard deviation IGamma (0.005, 2.00)
σg IS standard deviation IGamma (0.005, 2.00)
σtp Total standard deviation (including Chairman effect) IGamma (0.005, 2.00)
A.6. Bayesian Estimation
A.6.1. Data and Algorithm
I use three key macro-economic quarterly US time series as observable variables for the model
estimated in section 3: log of quarterly gross rate of the GDP deflator, the log deviation of
real GDP with respect to its long run trend, and the federal funds rate All data are available
from the FRED database. The data for the chairman turnover dates is available on the
website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The model is estimated
over the full sample period from 1966:I till 2008:II. To study how the measurement equations
are altered to incorporate the chairman effect, the following equations define the time-varying
parameter rule:
it = Φiit−1 + (1− Φi)[Φpi(p¯issφpi,t + pit) + Φyyt] + vt (17)
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φpi,t = ρpφpi,t−1 + t (18)
The complete model when estimated using three series allows me to capture ρp and
σp, where σp captures the standard deviation of changes in policy. To specifically identify
the “chairman effect” I introduce a chairman dummy in the AR(1) process for the policy
shock. The difference in volatility during periods when the chairman changes is identified
using information from a fourth data series in the model estimation. Specifically, this series
consists of values zero and one, with one specified against the quarters corresponding to
changes in the chairman of the Federal Reserve. In the data sample there are five changes in
the chairman therefore the dummy series has 5 observations equal to 1 at 1970:I (Martin),
1978:I (Burns), 1979:III (Miller), 1987:III (Volcker) and 2006:I (Greenspan). Observations
at other points in this series are set to zero. The corresponding measurement equations of
the quarterly model with the chairman dummy are (the bars denote steady state variables):

dlGDPt
dlPt
FEDFUNDSt
FEDTORt
 =

γ¯
p¯i − 1
r¯
0
+

yt − yt−1
pit
rt
σtp
 (19)
The complete model when estimated using these four series allows me to capture ρp and
σtp, where σtp captures the aggregate standard deviation of changes in policy. Then σdp , the
“chairman effect” is extracted simply as σdp = σtp − σp.
Finally, the following algorithm is used to compute the MH procedure:
1. Choose a starting value or prior for our parameters stacked in Θ.
2. Draw Θ∗ from Jt(Θ∗|Θt−1). The jumping distribution Jt(Θ∗|Θt−1) determines where
we move to in the next iteration of the Markov chain and contains the support of the
posterior.
3. Compute acceptance ratio r, according to:
r =
p(Θ∗|y)/Jt(Θ∗|Θt−1)
p(Θt−1|y)/Jt(Θt−1|Θ∗) (20)
If our candidate draw has higher probability than our current draw, then our candidate
is better so we definitely accept it. Otherwise, our candidate is accepted according to
the ratio of the probabilities of the candidate and current draws.
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4. Accept Θ∗ as Θt with probability min(r, 1). If Θ∗ is not accepted, then Θt = Θt−1.
Candidate draws with higher density than the current draw are always accepted.
A sample of 200000 draws was created, with 2 MH chains, and the first 20% of the sample
was rejected. The results remain robust when 200000 draws were created, with 5 MH chains
and so forth.
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A.6.2. Cross-Country Estimation
The following section describes the posterior estimates of the models parameters, which are
estimated using Bayesian estimation techniques using three, quarterly country-specific series:
log of quarterly gross rate of the GDP deflator/CPI, the log deviation of real GDP/production
index with respect to its long run trend, and the central bank policy rate. I use the HP de-
trended output with the relative weight of the smoothing component set to 1600 as also
done in Ascari et al. (2011). I include a fourth series that contains information pertaining
to changes in the chairman of the country-specific central bank. Details on the data sources
as well as the time period covered are summarized in appendix A.3. Table B.1 focuses on
the results for advanced countries while table B.2 summarizes the results for developing
countries.
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